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CONVENIENCE AND LOWER PRICES,                 
BUT AT WHAT COST?:                       
WATCHING CLOSELY AS DISCOUNT 
SUPERSTORES CREEP INTO MANHATTAN 
Kathleen Codey* 
INTRODUCTION 
The word “sprawl” evokes images of once rural areas littered 
with housing developments, strip malls, and winding highways.1 
Located within and between these strip malls and highways lie 
what retail industry insiders call “big box retailers.”2 Big box 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2005; B.A., Dartmouth College, 2002. For 
all of the help I received during this process, I would like to thank my family for 
their love and support, my roommates and friends for making me laugh and 
keeping me sane, and Dave Weiss for his uncanny ability to sense what I need 
and make every day more fun than the last. 
1 Edward H. Ziegler, Urban Sprawl, Growth Management and Sustainable 
Development in the United States: Thoughts on the Sentimental Quest for a New 
Middle Landscape, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 26, 29 (2003). Geographers and 
sociologists traditionally define “sprawl” as “low-density suburban and exurban 
growth that expands in an unlimited and noncontiguous (“leapfrog”) manner 
outward from the built-up core of a metropolitan area.” Id. See also J. Celeste 
Sakowicz, Note, Urban Sprawl: Florida’s and Maryland’s Approaches, 19 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 377, 381 (2004) (describing sprawl as a “land use 
pattern of sporadic, inconsistent development that occurs away from the center 
of the metropolis”). 
2 William E. Roper & Elizabeth Humstone, Wal-Mart in Vermont—The 
Case Against Sprawl, 22 VT. L. REV. 755, 755 (1998); Jonathan Moore Peterson, 
Taming the Sprawlmart: Using an Antitrust Arsenal to Further Historic 
Preservation Goals, 27 URB. LAW. 333, 335 (1995) (describing how big box 
retailers are characterized by their “economies of scale, warehouse-type stores, 
and low prices”). These stores are also criticized as being “shopper-snatchers” 
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retailers situate themselves in warehouse-type buildings that can 
occupy between 90,000 and 200,000 square feet.3 These stores 
either specialize in a single product line or sell a variety of 
products at discounted prices.4 In rural and suburban areas, such 
stores are surrounded by acres of parking lots that are situated 
close to major roads and highway interchanges to maximize 
consumer traffic.5 Offering lower prices that draw consumers and 
revenue incentives that attract state and local governments,6 
national chain stores position themselves in an attempt to capture a 
                                                          
and “category-killers.” See Jane Holtz Kay, Ticky-Tacky Big Boxes, THE 
NATION, available at http://www.janeholtzkay.com/Articles/boxes.html (coining 
the phrase “shopper-snatchers”); American Studies at Eastern Connecticut 
University, Shopping Mall Studies, General Terminology (2004), at 
http://www.easternct.edu/depts/amerst/MallsTerms.htm (defining “category 
killers” as “large national chain store[s] specializing in one line of products, 
such as hardware and home improvements, office supplies, or toys, that can 
overwhelm both smaller and more diverse competitors because of its size, 
variety of merchandise, and prices”). 
3 Roper & Humstone, supra note 2, at 755. See Constance E. Beaumont & 
Leslie Tucker, Big-Box Sprawl (And How to Control It), 43 MUN. LAW. 7, 9 
(2002) (“The U.S. had only five square feet of retail space per person in 1980; 
today, that number is 20 square feet.”). 
4 See American Studies at Eastern Connecticut University, Shopping Mall 
Studies, General Terminology (2004), at http://www.easternct.edu/depts/ 
amerst/MallsTerms.htm (defining “big box” as a “large stand-alone store that 
specializes in a single line of products” or a “no-frills discount stor[e] that sell[s] 
in volume”) (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). Common stores that specialize in a 
single product line include: Home Depot, which sells home improvement items; 
Best Buy, a discount electronics retailer; and chain drug stores such as CVS or 
Rite Aid. Discount retailers who diversify their product offerings include Kmart, 
Wal-Mart, and Target. 
5 Roper & Humstone, supra note 2, at 755. 
6 Justin Shoemaker, The Smalling of America?: Growth Management 
Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 48 DUKE L.J. 891, 900 (1999) 
(highlighting the financial and tax-related benefits to big box development). In 
communities with lower tax bases, large retailers with even larger profits offer 
an opportunity for counties and towns to significantly increase their tax 
revenues. Stephen Kinzer, Wal-Mart’s Big-City Plans Stall Again, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 6, 2004, at A27. The allure of extra tax revenue and the promise of added 
jobs can be enough for towns to ignore negative characteristics common to this 
kind of development. Id. 
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substantial portion of the local market.7 
But lower prices and new job opportunities are not the only 
effects these retailers have on communities, regardless of how hard 
a corporate public relations department tries to persuade residents 
otherwise.8 In rural areas, large-scale retail development spurs 
waves of secondary development, including new roads, sewage 
systems, and power stations.9 A significant quantity of literature 
details the deterioration of the picturesque town center in New 
England in the face of this development.10 In small northeastern 
                                                          
7 Shoemaker, supra note 6, at 900 (stating that the economic pressure to 
allow big box retail development is difficult for towns to resist). 
8 See Ikea Brochure, “Welcome to Brooklyn . . . Like No Other Place in the 
World!” (2003) (stating that between 500-600 new “permanent, high-quality 
jobs” will be created and there will be “tremendous benefits to the community”) 
(on file with author). But see Shoemaker, supra note 6, at 892 (arguing that 
“[s]prawl brings, among other things, strains on infrastructure, pollution, traffic 
congestion, the decline of city centers, the death of small towns, and the 
destruction of the landscape”); Beaumont & Tucker, supra note 3, at 7 (“In the 
view of many, big-box stores impose hidden costs that don’t appear on the price 
tags of the products they sell: traffic congestion; loss of trees, open space and 
farmland; displaced small businesses; substitution of jobs that support families 
with low-paying jobs that don’t; air and water pollution; dying downtowns with 
vacant buildings; abandoned shopping centers; a degraded sense of community; 
and sprawl.”). 
9 Roper & Humstone, supra note 2, at 773 (arguing that this kind of 
secondary development around retail centers can actually increase costs for 
taxpayers). 
10 See RICHARD V. FRANCAVIGLIA, MAIN STREET REVISITED: TIME, SPACE, 
AND IMAGE BUILDING IN SMALL-TOWN AMERICA (1996) (detailing the effects of 
sprawl on New England towns and villages). See also David Weiss, Small Town 
Identity, Power, and Sprawl: The Local Geopolitics of Wal-Mart Development 
in Northern Vermont 26 (2002) (unpublished B.A. honors thesis, Dartmouth 
College) (on file with the Dartmouth College Library) (detailing two Vermont 
towns’ battles for and against a proposed Wal-Mart); Jessica E. Jay, Note, The 
“Malling” of Vermont: Can the “Growth Center” Designation Save the 
Traditional Village from Suburban Sprawl?, 21 VT. L. REV. 929 (1997) 
(describing how Vermont and New England village town centers are at risk from 
unchecked development by big box retailers); Peterson, supra note 2, at 382 
(marveling at the fact that the National Trust for Historic Preservation placed the 
entire state of Vermont on its list of endangered places due to the threat it faces 
from sprawl). 
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towns, sprawling development is linked to a declining sense of 
community, as more residents choose to shop on highways than on 
Main Streets.11 In their quest to beat the competition by offering 
the lowest prices possible, national retailers such as Wal-Mart 
often destroy their local competition entirely.12 Whether located in 
rural, suburban, or urban areas, national chain stores have an 
undeniable economic impact on small, independent retailers.13 The 
big box battle is similarly fought in every retail sector and touches 
every store owner who offers the same goods or services as a big 
box retailer.14 
Beginning in the 1990s, as the pace of residential and 
commercial sprawl quickened, towns and private citizens 
discovered ways to fight back the onslaught of big box 
development. States passed environmental and growth-control 
legislation, towns enacted tailored zoning ordinances, and smaller 
retailers sued national chain stores for violations of state price 
                                                          
11 See Jay, supra note 10, for a complete discussion of sprawl’s impact on 
Vermont villages. 
12 See Wal-Mart Stores, About Wal-Mart, The Wal-Mart Culture, Pricing 
Philosophy [hereinafter Wal-Mart Pricing Philosophy] (outlining Wal-Mart’s 
commitment to beating the prices of competition), at http://www.walmartstores. 
com/wmstore/wmstores/HomePage.jsp (last visited Feb. 14, 2005); See SHARON 
ZUKIN, POINT OF PURCHASE 28 (2004) [hereinafter POINT OF PURCHASE] 
(alleging that “[t]he hulking glass boxes of superstores reflect the ghosts of a 
thousand corner groceries”). 
13 See ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: 
SUCCESSFUL LEGAL, PLANNING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 23 (Leslie 
Hollmann ed., American Bar Ass’n 1999) (noting that businesses are not 
immune to sprawl). In one town, a local hardware store manager commented 
that “[s]ince Home Depot opened in the Pittsburg (CA) area, the local True 
Value store, in business since the ‘30s has disappeared, two local nurseries, a 
flooring store, and a landscape supply yard is also gone or sold.” A Citizen’s 
View of Home Depot: Not in Our Hometown: The Orange Wars, at 
http://www.sprawl-busters.com/hometown.html (1997). 
14 See Glenn Collins, Decks and the City, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at B1. 
This article, published two days before the Flatiron location of The Home Depot 
was to open, features an interview with an independent locksmith regarding his 
reaction to the grand opening. Id. The locksmith expressed concern about his 
business’s chances of survival because The Home Depot has priced its services 
lower than those of the locksmith. Id. 
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discrimination laws.15 Despite these efforts, large, national retailers 
continue to dominate the marketplace, putting even the most 
resilient merchants out of business. 
Notably, while rural and suburban areas have attempted to 
blockade further development and mitigate its current effects,16 
urban centers such as Chicago and New York have welcomed this 
same development with open arms.17 The Home Depot opened its 
sixteenth store in New York City on September 10, 2004, and its 
seventeenth location on December 16, 2004, both to much 
fanfare.18 Located in Manhattan’s Flatiron and Midtown 
neighborhoods, the new stores span 83,000 and 108,000 square 
feet, respectively, and follow Home Depot’s “urban neighborhood” 
store format.19 Tom Taylor, president of Home Depot’s Eastern 
Division, states that the new stores “will meet a huge untapped 
demand for home improvement products and services in 
                                                          
15 See Peterson, supra note 2 (describing private federal antitrust litigation, 
state historical preservation laws, and local zoning plans). 
16 See Jay, supra note 10, at 943-54, for a complete discussion of the 
options available to towns and states wishing to slow the spread of sprawl. 
17 See Press Release, Home Depot, Home Depot Announces its Second 
Manhattan Store (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://ir.homedepot.com/Release 
Detail.cfm?ReleaseID=118589 (stating that the Midtown store will be located at 
984 Third Avenue between 58th and 59th Streets). The lower Manhattan 
location will be 32 West 23rd Street near Fifth Avenue. Id. Although the 
Chicago City Council recently voted against changing city zoning regulations 
that would allow a second proposed Wal-Mart, the Chicago City Council 
approved a zoning change in May, 2004 that cleared the way for construction of 
a Wal-Mart in its West Side neighborhood. Wal-Mart Halts Chicago Store, 
RETAIL MERCHANDISER, Sept. 1, 2004, at http://www.retail-merchandiser.com/ 
retailmerchandiser/headlines/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000622363. 
18 Press Release, Home Depot, The Home Depot to Open First Manhattan 
Store on Friday (Sept. 9, 2004), available at http://ir.homedepot.com/ 
ReleaseDetail.cfm?PrintPage=yes&ReleaseID=142842; Press Release, Home 
Depot, Act II: The Home Depot Takes Center Stage With Second Manhattan 
Store (Dec. 16, 2004), available at http://ir.homedepot.com/ReleaseDetail. 
cfm?ReleaseID=150678. 
19 Id. The “urban neighborhood” format means that the store will carry 
products specifically geared to the urban lifestyle of Manhattan residents. Id. 
The store’s stock includes fewer construction materials and more furnishings 
than a typical suburban store. Id. 
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Manhattan.”20 The “untapped” Manhattan home improvement 
market to which Taylor refers, however, contains 236 stores within 
a five-mile radius of the Midtown location; eleven of the stores are 
located within a one-mile radius of the new location.21 Similarly, 
the five-mile radius of the Flatiron store contains 267 home 
improvement stores, eleven of which are in a one-mile radius of 
the Flatiron location.22 If the experiences of independent retailers 
in suburban and rural areas are any indication, independent 
hardware and home improvement stores in New York City may 
soon die a slow financial death that will unalterably change 
Manhattan’s retail landscape, impact neighborhood character, and 
harm the city’s economy.23 
This note focuses on the uphill battle that confronts New York 
City’s small business retailers and residents in the face of a 
potential overhaul of the city’s retail structure and culture. Given 
that big box retailers have been eyeing urban areas for years, it is 
likely that other retailers will follow Home Depot to Manhattan, 
intensifying and diversifying the impact on the city’s small 
businesses.24 Part I of this note describes the unique features and 
                                                          
20 Id. 
21 Yellowpages.com, available at http://www.yellowpages.com (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2004). In order to conduct this query, I used a store search by 
“Distance,” entered the address of the Midtown location, entered the category 
“hardware” and set the search radius to 5 miles, then 1 mile. 
22 Yellowpages.com, available at http://www.yellowpages.com (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2004). In order to conduct this query, I used a store search by 
“Distance,” entered the address of the Flatiron location, entered the category 
“hardware” and set the search radius to 5 miles, then 1 mile. 
23 See Kay, supra, note 2. Kay writes that superstores “negate planning and 
drain cities of their very citiness—the complex web of shops, restaurants, and 
small scale enterprises that support the vitality and diversity of street life and 
make urban institutions viable.” Id.; AL NORMAN, SLAM DUNKING WAL-MART 
(1999), available at http://www.sprawl-busters.com/caseagainstsprawl.html 
(noting that saturated retail markets deteriorate the economy). 
24 Brannon Boswell & Alex McGrath, We’ll Take Manhattan, RETAIL 
TRAFFIC, Vol. 32, May 1, 2003, at 100. Of all urban markets, retailers have been 
especially hesitant to enter the Manhattan market. Id. Retailers often cite high 
rents, lack of suitable space, logistical problems such as traffic, and NIMBYism 
(“Not In My Back-yard”) of Manhattan residents as the sources of their 
reluctance. Id. Depending on how well The Home Depot fares in Manhattan, 
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attributes of New York City that merit vigorous protection by the 
mayor, city agencies, and the New York State legislature. Part II 
discusses the historical underpinnings and present uses of zoning 
law as a means of controlling land development. Part III examines 
federal and state efforts to promote environmentally-conscious 
decision making by federal, state, and regional planners in the 
evaluation of proposed development projects. Part IV explores the 
background of federal and state antitrust law and discusses the 
ways in which state antitrust laws have been used to address the 
threats to small businesses posed by large national retailers. Part V 
discusses the limitations of each of the legal options available to 
New York City in its fight against big box retailers. Finally, with 
an emphasis on the need for a new statutory scheme in New York 
State, Part VI outlines the means by which other states have 
stemmed the tide of retail invasion and suggests that New York 
City might do the same by passing a stricter antitrust statute. This 
note concludes that national big box retailers will cause more harm 
than good to New York City’s residents and that their entrance into 
the urban market should be closely scrutinized.25 
I. THE CHANGING RETAIL LANDSCAPE 
Manhattan boasts a diverse and vibrant retail sector in which 
small businesses remain vulnerable to the entrance of additional 
national chain retailers.26 Although national chain retailing had its 
start many miles from New York City, industry leaders have 
established themselves as market-changing forces that impact 
                                                          
however, the retailer may allay fears and attract increased interest from other 
retailers. Id. 
25 Arguments in favor of the entrance of Wal-Marts and other big box 
retailers into local retail markets often focus on the jobs that these stores bring, 
their convenience, and their ability to offer lower prices for goods. See Diane 
Cardwell, Suburban Retailing for the New Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, 
at B1 (describing how some Brooklyn big box retailers “represent long-overdue 
amenities and convenience, in addition to the promise of jobs”). 
26 See infra Part I.B. (discussing the Manhattan retail landscape and the 
influx of big box retailers). 
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communities wherever their stores are built.27 This section profiles 
the beginnings of “big box” retailing and traces the development of 
Manhattan’s retail economy through the present time in order to 
provide context for the potential impact of further retail chain 
development on the borough of Manhattan. 
A. The Trend of Big Box Retailing 
In 1962, Sam Walton opened the first Wal-Mart store in 
Arkansas, marking the beginning of a new era in retailing.28 
Although Kmart and Target also opened their first outposts that 
same year, Wal-Mart’s unique corporate philosophies established it 
as the leader in the discount retailing business.29 Sam Walton 
expanded his chain of variety stores to compete with the regional 
discount retailers of the 1960s who were cutting into his market.30 
In doing so, he took charge of the retail market by building 
discount stores that advanced a bargain culture and an emphasis on 
community.31 Together, these stores “ushered in a new order of 
shopping.”32 Unlike the department stores already in existence, 
these discount retailers targeted the middle-income shopper and 
                                                          
27 See infra Part I.A. (summarizing a study conducted to analyze the 
economic impact of big box retailers on urban communities). See also supra 
notes 8-14 (describing big box retail impacts on rural communities). 
28 See Wal-Mart Stores, About Wal-Mart, The Wal-Mart Culture, The 
Story of Wal-Mart [hereinafter Story of Wal-Mart] (stating that the first Wal-
Mart opened in Rogers, Arkansas in 1962), at http://www.walmartstores.com/ 
wmstore/wmstores/HomePage.jsp (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). 
29 See id. When Wal-Mart went public in 1970 it received the funds to 
rapidly spread across the nation and establish a toehold over its competitors. Id. 
See also POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 82 (noting that Sam Walton 
instituted a unique corporate strategy involving heavy employee oversight, a no-
frills corporate policy that applied to employees and store décor, and a heavy-
handed management style). 
30 See The Story of Wal-Mart, supra note 28 (describing how Sam Walton 
wished to compete with larger regional chain stores). 
31 POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 80 (noting that in “Wal-Mart’s 
mythology . . . a discount store is a space of community as well as of bargain 
culture”). 
32 Id. 
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offered brand name products at bargain prices in a convenient, 
one-stop-shopping setting.33 Wal-Mart currently boasts annual 
sales of more than a quarter trillion dollars and stands as the 
world’s largest company, employing 1.3 million workers who 
serve an estimated 100 million customers each week.34 
Economists and urban planners have documented the notable 
impact of large national chain stores on the basic economics of the 
retail industry and city life generally.35 Stores such as Wal-Mart, 
Home Depot, Target, and their counterparts sell the same or 
substantially similar items at consistently low prices.36 In contrast 
to the product originality heralded by smaller stores, national chain 
retailers emphasize the quantity of sales and aim to sell the greatest 
number of items possible in order to generate revenue.37 The mass 
sale of similar products is enabled by negotiations between large 
nationwide retailers and suppliers. Through supplier arrangements, 
large, nationwide retailers can negotiate reduced prices from 
suppliers and, in turn, can price their inventories at lower amounts 
                                                          
33 Id. at 83-84. “From Woolworth’s to Wal-Mart, these stores have 
encouraged us to think ‘low prices—every day’ is a universal human right.” Id. 
at 84. 
34 Andy Serwer et al., The Waltons: Inside America’s Richest Family, 
FORTUNE, Nov. 15, 2004, at 86; Wal-Mart Stores, News Center, Facts, Photos, 
and General Information, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. at a Glance, at 
http://www.walmartstores.com/wmstore/wmstores/HomePage.jsp (providing 
statistics for the number of Wal-Mart employees and customers). 
35 See Mark Jacobson, Supersize City: How could it be there are more 
McDonalds here than anywhere else?, NEW YORK, May 10, 2004, at 30 
(lamenting the influx of national retailers and restaurants into Manhattan); 
POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 63 (discussing how big box stores sell 
things you can get anywhere, but at a lower price). 
36 See Sam’s Way, at http://www.walmart.com/cservice/aw_samsway.gsp? 
NavMode=9 (assuring Wal-Mart customers that the company will pass along 
savings to them, and offer their assortment of products at “Every Day Low 
Prices”). 
37 See Wal-Mart Pricing Philosophy, supra note 12 (describing Wal-Mart’s 
commitment towards striving for a high volume of sales to make up for 
discounted prices); POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 63 (stating that 
discount stores are “places where you don’t shop for something special that you 
can’t find anywhere else: you shop for the lowest prices”). 
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than their smaller, regional competitors.38 
Attracted by the lower prices enabled by supplier 
arrangements, consumers frequently elect to shop at large national 
chain stores instead of smaller local retailers. By way of example, 
the consumer who once shopped at the neighborhood hardware 
store for paint or at the drug store for Tylenol knows that the 
product will be identical whether purchased from small retailer X 
or big chain store Y. As a result, the consumer will buy the product 
where it costs less, usually at chain store Y.39 Similarly, the 
consumer who once paid a premium for an original piece of 
clothing may sacrifice his desire for uniqueness for the “right 
price,” settling instead on an imitation design.40 The pricing 
schemes of national chain retailers affect even the most rooted 
competitors and frequently drive smaller competitors out of the 
market.41 
This phenomenon is especially noticeable in the retail clothing 
industry.42 Since the advent of the discount superstore, “retail 
merchants have been torn between marketing to shoppers’ interest 
in low prices and to their emotional identification with specific 
brands.”43 Many retailers have gone out of business, unable to 
                                                          
38 See Anthony Bianco & Wendy Zellner, Low prices are great. But Wal-
Mart’s dominance creates problems—for suppliers, workers, communities and 
even American culture; Is Wal-Mart Too Powerful?, BUS. WK., Oct. 6, 2003, at 
100, available at 2003 WL 62195858 (“Wal-Mart has relentlessly wrung tens of 
billions of dollars in cost efficiencies out of the retail supply chain, passing the 
larger part of the savings along to shoppers as bargain prices.”); Jay, supra note 
10, at 941 (stating that neighborhood “mom and pop” stores have difficulty 
matching the price and selection of larger retailers). 
39 See Bianco & Zellner, supra note 38. Bianco & Zellner describe how 
Wal-Mart passes along savings to customers and is then rewarded by seeing 135 
million shoppers per week shop in its stores. Id. 
40 POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 63 (noting that discount stores 
“are places where you don’t shop for something special that you can’t find 
anywhere else: you shop for the lowest prices”). 
41 See Bianco & Zellner, supra note 38. For every Wal-Mart supercenter 
that opens in the next 5 years, two other supermarkets will close. Id. 
42 See POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 101. 
43 Id. 
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compete with the low prices of Target and Wal-Mart.44 A study 
commissioned by one Chicago neighborhood facing future “big 
box” development highlights the economic impact of retail 
development on local communities.45 The study compared the 
economic impact on the local community of ten local businesses to 
the impact of an equal number of chain store competitors.46 The 
study concluded that the apparent positive economic impacts of 
chain stores on the community disappear when a municipality 
accounts for commonly-ignored factors such as revenue and square 
footage.47 According to the study, for every $100 that a consumer 
spends at a chain store, $43 will remain in the local economy.48 By 
contrast, for every $100 that a consumer spends at a local business, 
$73 will remain in the local economy.49 The study concluded that 
locally-owned businesses offer communities a quantifiable 
advantage over national competitors in the form of charitable 
contributions, expenditures on local labor, and additional money 
circulating in the local economy.50 
                                                          
44 Id. 
45 See Civic Economics, The Andersonville Study of Retail Economics 4 
(Oct. 2004) [hereinafter Andersonville Study] (comparing ten local firms to ten 
chain stores), available at http://www.newrules.org/retail/news_slug.php? 
slugid=269. Andersonville is a Chicago neighborhood that is attracting interest 
from national chain retailers. Id. at 2. The Andersonville Development 
Corporation and Andersonville Chamber of Commerce commissioned the study 
to assess the economic impact a proposed Borders bookstore would have on the 
existing downtown businesses. Id. 
46 Id. at 2. 
47 Id. at 3. 
48 Id. at 5. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. “That means 70 percent more money circulating in the local 
economy, which may mean 70 percent more home improvement, 70 percent 
more in the collection plate, and 70 percent more in taxable transactions to fund 
city services.” Id. See id. at 4-5 (describing how once the economic impact 
studies were adjusted for the size of the stores, the local businesses produced 
more positive impact than the national chain stores). Additional studies 
conducted in other communities support these conclusions. 
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B. New York City 
Geographers, city planners, and residents appreciate and extol 
the virtues of New York City’s retail landscape.51 Stretching over 
twenty-two square miles, each of Manhattan’s neighborhoods has 
distinct architecture, residents, restaurant offerings, and retail 
landscapes.52 The city’s retail offerings play a large part in creating 
and preserving its culture.53 “The wealth and variety of new shops 
in New York enable the media to present shopping as one of the 
city’s cultural attractions—an alternative to the suburbanization 
and standardization that have engulfed the rest of the country.”54 
Manhattan’s first distinct retailing district emerged in the late 
eighteenth century with the 1948 opening of New York City’s first 
department store, A.T. Stewart’s Marble Palace.55 Originally 
                                                          
51 See Paul Goldberger, The Malling of Manhattan, METROPOLIS MAG., 
Mar. 2001, available at http://www.metropolismag.com/html/content_0301 
/nyc.htm  (extolling the benefits and advantages to living in Manhattan); New 
York City & Company, Shopping (2004) [hereinafter New York City Shopping] 
(New York City’s official tourism website touts the city as a “shopper’s 
paradise,” claiming that a shopper can find “anything here from every corner of 
the globe.”), at http://www.nycvisit.com/shopSearch/index.cfm?pagePkey= 
1281.  
52 NY.com, at http://www.ny.com/histfacts/statistics.html. 
53 SHARON ZUKIN, THE CULTURES OF CITIES 187-88 (1995) [hereinafter 
CULTURES OF CITIES]. Zukin devotes an entire chapter of her book to the role 
that shopping plays in urban centers and notes that among the many effects retail 
shopping has, it is “one of the modern city’s greatest cultural attractions.” Id. 
Zukin also writes that central shopping districts and consumption spaces are 
places where “identities and communities are formed.” Id. at 190. The author, a 
Manhattan resident, also vividly describes her shopping rituals and praises 
Manhattan’s shopping opportunities. Id. “The variety of goods, the scale of the 
stores, the easy conversations with farmers and shopkeepers: these are things I 
love about New York; they make the city’s huge size and fast pace bearable.” Id. 
at 5. See also Steven Kurutz, Obsessed!, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2004, §14, at 1 
(discussing the grocery store loyalty and the ensuing grocery store “culture” in 
Manhattan). 
54 POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 27. 
55 Mona Domosh, Shaping the Commercial City: Retail Districts in 
Nineteenth-Century New York and Boston, 80 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. 
GEOGRAPHY 268, 273-74 (New York’s retailing district first emerged in 1780); 
POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 21 (discussing A.T. Stewart’s Marble 
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located on the southern tip of Manhattan, the borough’s retail 
district eventually moved uptown by 1920, as most of the big 
department stores relocated to Midtown to follow their consumer 
base.56 Between 1880 and 1920, the “golden age of department 
stores,” these retailers became the “new theaters of consumption” 
and helped transform shopping into one of New York City’s 
principal attractions.57 In contrast to the national chain stores that 
presently dominate the marketplace, the city’s department stores 
did not offer their goods at discount prices;58 rather, they enticed 
customers, mainly women, with desired personal services and 
amenities.59 The early department stores influenced Manhattan’s 
cultural development and quickly became surrounded by a diverse 
array of retailers providing goods other than clothing.60 During the 
next century, smaller retailers spread throughout Manhattan, 
spurred on by a strong capitalist drive in the marketplace, the 
faltering of urban department stores in the 1970s, and a strong 
wave of immigration.61 Smaller retailers eventually assumed their 
position as a mainstay of Manhattan’s and New York City’s 
culture.62 
                                                          
Palace). 
56 POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 116 (stating that B. Altman, 
Macy’s, Lord & Taylor, and Bonwit Teller eventually settled between Thirty-
sixth and Forty-fourth Streets); Id. at 21 (stating that Saks Fifth Avenue and 
Bonwit Teller eventually relocated even further north). 
57 Id. at 20. 
58 Id. at 119. Another difference between department stores and big box 
discount stores relates to the products they sell. Id. at 140. Starting in the 1960s, 
most department stores, with the exception of Sears, eliminated the “hard” 
goods from their inventory and began to focus solely on clothing and 
sometimes, furniture. Id. 
59 Id. (noting that B. Altman wooed middle-class women shoppers with 
personal services like hairdressing salons and fur storage and with such 
amenities as elegant ladies’ rooms, restaurants, and post offices). 
60 Id. at 21 (noting that “[f]rom the 1840s, street corners sprouted butcher 
shops, bakeries, and grocery stores, while more expensive shops for luxury 
goods clustered in the center”). 
61 Id. at 24-25 (describing the rise and fall or department stores, and the 
role of immigrant entrepreneurs in reshaping New York City’s retail 
composition). 
62 POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 9 (comparing Manhattan to 
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In 1996, Manhattan greeted its first national discount retailer.63 
Kmart moved that year into two locations, one in the East Village 
into a building once occupied by the Wanamaker department store, 
and a second in Midtown in a building attached to Pennsylvania 
Railroad Station.64 Following Kmart’s lead, other large, national 
chain stores, including Best Buy, Staples, Office Depot, and 
eventually, Home Depot, soon entered the Manhattan retail market. 
In September 2004, Home Depot opened a new two-story outpost 
in the Flatiron District of Manhattan, prompting one critic to 
lament that the borough was becoming homogenized by chain 
stores and restaurants.65 
II. ZONING LAW 
Zoning law is the oldest and most frequently utilized legal 
option to control land use development.66 Zoning ordinances 
“dictate the types of uses to which land may be put, the density at 
which development may happen, the height, size and shape of 
buildings, and the mix of commercial, residential, public, and other 
                                                          
Philadelphia and noting that all of Manhattan seems like a “downtown” 
shopping district). See id. at 19-20 (describing the factors which contributed to 
the strengthening of Manhattan’s retail culture). 
63 Amy Tsao, Manhattan—Where Discount Retailers Fear to Tread, BUS. 
WK. ONLINE, Jan. 23, 2002, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
bwdaily/dnflash/jan2002/nf20020123_0412.htm (stating that Kmart moved into 
its East Village location in 1996). 
64 Id; POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 87 (stating that Kmart took 
over the old Wanamaker department store). Kmart operates its second 
Manhattan location at 250 West 34th Street. Kmart Store Locator, at 
https://mykmart.com/storelocator/storelocator/storelocatorindex.jsp (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2004). 
65 Jacobson, supra note 35, at 30. 
66 RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY: GEOGRAPHY, LAW 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 215 (Island Press 1996) (explaining that zoning gained its 
popularity in the 1920s). Zoning gained popularity as the nation’s character 
shifted from rural to urban and communities needed a regulatory measure to 
control land use. Id. Land use zoning is the most widespread technique used to 
control land use in every major United States city except for Houston, Texas. Id. 
at 216. Zoning is also the broadest available technique since it applies to most 
uses of private land as well as public. Id. at 217. 
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land uses in each locality.”67 Although it originated in Germany, 
zoning has become a “quintessentially American institution” due to 
its enthusiastic adoption by the United States beginning in the 
seventeenth century.68 Land-use zoning owes much of its 
popularity to the fact that it is the broadest available land control 
technique.69 
A. Zoning and the Federal Government 
Zoning gained national recognition and government support in 
1922, when the U.S. Department of Commerce published a model 
statute called the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA).70 
The SZEA empowered and encouraged the legislative bodies of 
states to, in turn, empower their municipalities to enact zoning 
regulations for a variety of purposes so long as the resulting 
regulations were in accordance with a “comprehensive plan.”71 To 
provide additional guidance on the meaning of the term 
“comprehensive plan,” the Department of Commerce issued a 
second model act in 1928, the Standard City Planning Enabling 
                                                          
67 John R. Nolon, Comprehensive Land Use Planning: Learning How and 
Where to Grow, 13 PACE L. REV. 351, 351 (1993). 
68 PLATT, supra note 66, at 215; ALEXANDER GARVIN, THE AMERICAN 
CITY: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T 356 (McGraw-Hill 1996). Boston, 
Massachusetts enacted legislation in 1672 that set regulations for building 
materials. Id. In 1692 the Province of Massachusetts Bay limited certain 
businesses to particular areas. Nolon, supra note 70, at 356. In 1869, an Illinois 
developer created deed restrictions for housing placement and decoration. Id. 
69 PLATT, supra note 66, at 216-17 (noting that zoning can be applied to “to 
virtually any private use of land and many public uses” and is the most 
widespread, broadest, and most contentious land use tool). Zoning is considered 
contentious because it has endured spates of public support, ambivalence, and 
opposition. Id. at 216. 
70 Nolon, supra note 67, at 357. See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of 
1926, available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct 
1926.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). 
71 See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, § 1 (1926) (empowering local 
legislative bodies to enact zoning regulations) (last visited Oct. 29, 2004). See 
also id. at §3 (providing that “[s]uch regulations shall be made in accordance 
with a comprehensive plan”) (last visited Oct. 29, 2004). 
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Act (SPEA).72 All fifty states subsequently enacted some version 
of the SZEA; to date, forty-seven of these statutes remain in 
force.73 
In 1926, municipal exercises of zoning power were upheld by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler 
Realty Company.74 In that case, the plaintiff landowner challenged 
the municipality’s zoning ordinance, arguing that its encroachment 
upon his property violated his federal and state constitutional rights 
and lowered the value of his land.75 The Court upheld the village’s 
zoning ordinance and granted broad constitutional leeway to 
municipal zoning attempts nationwide, recognizing that the 
nation’s shift towards an urban character required municipal 
regulation.76 
Village of Euclid established a deferential standard of review 
for the zoning decisions of local governments.77 The Court 
                                                          
72 See Nolon, supra note 67, at 359 (discussing the purpose and effects of 
the Standard City Planning Enabling Act); Standard City Planning Enabling Act 
of 1928, available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/CPEnabling 
Act1928.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
73 Michael Lewyn, Twenty-First Century Planning and the Constitution, 74 
U. COLO. L. REV. 651, 655-56 (citing Am. Planning Ass’n, Growing Smart 
Legislative Guidebook: Model Statutes for Planning and the Management of 
Change (2002), available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/ (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2004). 
74 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
75 Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384: 
The ordinance is assailed on the grounds that it is in derogation of 
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution in 
that it deprives appellee of liberty and property without due process of 
law and denies it the equal protection of the law, and that it offends 
against certain provisions of the Constitution of the state of Ohio. 
Id. 
76 Id. at 388 (upholding the ordinance). The Court recognized that “[u]ntil 
recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but, with the great increase 
and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are 
developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in 
respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities.” Id. at 
386-87. 
77 Id. at 388. The majority held that in order to be upheld, zoning 
ordinances and regulations “must find their justification in some aspect of the 
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explained that local zoning ordinances will be upheld as 
constitutional so long as they are not clearly arbitrary and 
unreasonable, and bear a substantial relation to “public health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare.”78 The majority noted that as 
communities continue to grow and develop, they would require 
“additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of 
private lands in urban communities.”79 
B. Zoning and Planning Processes in New York City 
New York adopted and codified the Standard Zoning Enabling 
Act in 1913 and authorized its cities, and later its towns and 
villages, to create plans and zone for specific land use so long as 
they performed these functions in accordance with a 
“comprehensive plan.”80 New York City derives its power to zone 
for specific land usage within its borders from this state 
legislation.81 Due to the legislation’s emphasis on compliance with 
a comprehensive plan, land use planning provides the backdrop for 
municipal zoning actions and guides the decisions made jointly by 
                                                          
police power, asserted for the public welfare.” Id. The Court also noted that the 
issue of an ordinance’s legitimacy “varies with circumstances and conditions.” 
Id. See also Patrick J. Skelley, Defending the Frontier (Again): Rural 
Communities, Leap-Frog Development, and Reverse Exclusionary Zoning, 16 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 273, 276-77 (1997) (describing how local governments benefit 
from the decision in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Company). 
78 Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. 
79 Id. at 386-87. 
80 See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(24)-(25) (McKinney 2004) (The 
legislature enacted this legislation in 1913.); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney 
2004) (the legislature enacted this legislation in 1932); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-
700 (McKinney 2004) (the legislature enacted this statute in 1972). See also 
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 263; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-704; N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 
20(25) (McKinney 2004). These three provisions use the terms “comprehensive 
plan” and “well-considered plan” interchangeably. 
81 New York City Department of City Planning, Zoning, History of NYC 
Zoning [hereinafter New York City Zoning History], at http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/dcp/html/zone/zonehis.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). Although New 
York City’s 1916 zoning ordinance was the first in the nation, it subsequently 
had to tailor itself to state zoning law requirements. Id. 
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the New York City Council and Planning Commission.82 
Enacted in 1961, the New York City Zoning Resolution 
(Resolution) provides the foundation for every city land use 
decision.83 The Resolution contains a map of the entire city and 
depicts the uses for which pieces of land are zoned. The text of the 
Resolution “establishes zoning districts and sets forth the 
regulations governing land use and development.”84 Within the 
municipal government, the City Planning Commission has the 
authority to propose and adopt resolutions that amend the text or 
zoning maps of the Resolution; however, the City Council, the 
city’s legislative body, retains the exclusive authority to enact or 
reject these amendments.85 Further, the New York City Charter 
authorizes the City Council to amend or enact regulations on its 
own accord, provided that the Council considers the potential 
effects of the regulations on surrounding areas and implements the 
regulations as part of a comprehensive plan that is drafted by the 
                                                          
82 See New York City Zoning History, supra note 81 (stating that the 
Resolution took effect in 1961); NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. 
VII, § 75-00, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.html 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (describing the joint authority of the City Planning 
Commission and City Council). See also Nolon, supra note 67, at 352 
(describing how zoning and planning go hand in hand since “[a]s the predicate 
for zoning, comprehensive planning is a critical public function”). 
83 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. I, § 11-111, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.html (last visited Feb. 14, 
2004) (decreeing that all new development on unused land shall be in 
accordance with the regulations of the Resolution); Id. at §11-112 (decreeing 
that all new development on previously developed land shall be in accordance 
with the regulations of the Resolution). 
84 New York City Department of City Planning, Zoning, Zoning Text, at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.html (last visited Feb. 14, 
2005). 
85 The procedure for amendments to the Zoning Resolution is as follows: 
“The City Planning Commission shall adopt resolutions to amend the text of this 
Resolution or the zoning maps incorporated therein, and the City Council shall 
act upon such amendments, in accordance with the provisions of the New York 
City Charter.” NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. VII, § 75-00, 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.html (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2005). 
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City Planning Commission.86 
Since the 1961 enactment of its Zoning Resolution, New York 
City has relied on the local zoning ordinance to control the pace 
and form of development in the metropolis.87 By statute, New 
York City may exercise its zoning discretion with respect to 
building type, height, and usage, provided that its zoning 
regulations are “designed to promote the public health, safety, and 
general welfare.”88 New York City’s zoning scheme classifies each 
piece of land by its use: manufacturing, commercial, and 
residential.89 Development within each of these districts then 
depends upon the use, bulk, and parking requirements found within 
the Zoning Resolution.90 For instance, any new development on a 
                                                          
86 N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(25) (McKinney 2004). Section 20(25) states 
that the city may: 
regulate and restrict the location of trades and industries and the 
location of buildings, designed for specified uses, and for said purposes 
to divide the city into districts and to prescribe for each such district the 
trades and industries that shall be excluded or subjected to special 
regulation and the uses for which buildings may not be erected or 
altered. Such regulations shall be designed to promote the public 
health, safety and general welfare and shall be made with reasonable 
consideration, among other things, to the character of the district, its 
peculiar suitability for particular uses, the conservation of property 
values and the direction of building development, in accord with a well 
considered plan. 
Id. Although New York City’s Department of City Planning oversees the 
planning and land-use processes of New York City, the City Planning 
Commission is the entity that directly oversees the drafting of amendments to 
the City Zoning Resolution and administers the provisions of the existing 
resolution. New York City Department of City Planning, Zoning, About Zoning 
[hereinafter About New York City Zoning], at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetod.html (last visited Feb. 14, 
2005). 
87 Nolon, supra note 67, at 367. For a broad history of New York City 
zoning law, see New York City Zoning History, supra note 81. 
88 N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20 (McKinney 2004). Generally, section 20 is a 
grant of specific powers to New York City government. Sections 24 and 25 
specifically relate to the granting of zoning powers given to the city. 
89 About New York City Zoning, supra note 86 (stating that the three types 
of designation are residential, commercial, and manufacturing). 
90 Id. Stating that: 
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parcel of land in New York City must comply with the land’s use 
as designated by the 1961 Zoning Resolution.91 If a developer 
wishes to construct a building that does not comply with the 
parcel’s designation, he must challenge the ordinance before the 
Board of Standards and Appeals or the City Planning 
Commission.92 However, if the development does not conflict with 
the zoning map designation, the developer is entitled to proceed 
with development “as-of-right” and need only obtain a building 
permit before commencing construction.93 The privilege of as-of-
                                                          
Each zoning district regulates permitted uses; the size (bulk) of the 
building permitted in relation to the size of the lot; the required open 
space for residential uses on the lot or the maximum amount of 
building coverage showed on the lot; the number of dwelling units 
permitted on the lot; the distance between the building and the street; 
the distance between the building and the lot line; the amount of 
parking required; and other requirements applicable to specific 
residential, commercial, or manufacturing activities, including the size 
and placement of signs. 
Id. 
91 NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. I, ch. 1, §§11-112, available 
at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.html (last visited Feb. 14 
2005) (stating that all new uses of land can only be used, constructed or 
developed in accordance with the Zoning Resolution). 
92 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. VII, § 72-01, available 
at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.html (2004) (granting broad 
powers to the Board of Standards and Appeals for review of the resolution). See 
also NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. VII, § 74-01, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.html (last visited Feb. 14, 
2005) (granting power to the City Planning Commission to hear applications for 
modification of zoning designations). Although dual authority exists, the City 
Planning Commission must still follow the provisions of the Zoning Resolution 
when making its decisions. Id. 
93 About New York City Zoning, supra note 86 (defining “as-of-right 
development”). The Department of City Planning stipulates that: 
Most development or use of unimproved land need meet only the 
provisions of the Zoning Resolution to be granted a building permit as 
a matter of right. This means that a developer may build a structure “as-
of-right” if the Department of Buildings is satisfied that the structure 
complies with the provisions of the Zoning Resolution and the Building 
Code. No action is required by the City Planning Commission under 
such circumstances. The developer simply files plans with the 
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right development eliminates the need for input from the City 
Planning Commission.94 
C. Zoning as a Tool to Encourage Smart Retail Development 
Due to the practical implications of zoning and land use 
regulations, “they are perhaps the greatest determinative factor of 
whether a project can be constructed at a given site.”95 Since 
zoning decisions enjoy great judicial deference, municipalities 
frequently invoke zoning for specific purposes, including fighting 
unwanted retail development.96 To control retail development, a 
municipality must accomplish two things. First, it must create a 
comprehensive plan that announces its goal of regulating future 
development.97 Next, it must enact zoning ordinances that 
implement the plan.98 According to Village of Euclid, after 
complying with the above steps, the city can defend its zoning 
decisions on the grounds that the ordinance was not clearly 
                                                          




95 MICHAEL E. CUSACK & JOHN P. STOCKLI, JR., ZONING AND LAND USE 3 
(New York State Bar Association 2003). 
96 See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial 
deference exhibited towards zoning decisions); Nolon, supra note 67, at 353 
(noting that since localities are responsible for zoning, they can zone in order to 
accomplish their own specific objectives); NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING 
RESOLUTION art. I available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/ 
zonetext.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (The preamble to the city’s zoning 
resolution states that “[t]his Resolution is adopted in order to promote and 
protect public health, safety and general welfare.”). See also Forte v. Borough of 
Tenafly, 255 A.2d 804 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) (considering that the 
purpose of the town’s zoning decision was to restrict commercial development 
to specific property as a means of revitalizing the town’s central business 
district, the court upheld the zoning decision even after Plaintiff purchased land 
intending to build a supermarket, and the town subsequently rezoned the land 
for non-commercial use). 
97 See Nolon, supra note 67, at 352 (arguing that since a town’s plan can be 
whatever the town wants it to be, zoning is equally malleable). 
98 Id. 
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arbitrary or unreasonable and that it was a valid exercise of the 
municipality’s police power.99 
Municipalities and states have taken different approaches in 
their attempts to use zoning law as a tool to guard against future 
“big box” development in their communities. For example, city 
zoning ordinances may place caps on the square footage of an 
allowed development, set forth stringent rules regarding parking 
lots on a given site, or even require the completion of economic 
impact studies that relate to proposed development.100 Although 
these efforts have met with sporadic success, large national 
retailers have adapted themselves to meet these efforts, even 
reducing the size of their stores by 1,000 square feet so as to avoid 
the 100,000 square feet cap imposed by some municipalities.101 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
In recognition of the potential impact of land use development 
projects on the environment, Congress enacted the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969.102 NEPA sought to 
                                                          
99 Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. See supra Part II.A. 
100 See Sprawl-Busters, Victories (2004), at http://www.sprawl-
busters.com/victoryz.html. This portion of the Sprawl-Busters website contains 
links articles documenting successful efforts of communities to block big box 
retailers. Id. In Kansas, one municipality adopted a multi-faceted ordinance that 
stipulated detailed caps on square footage as well as regulations concerning the 
parking lot’s size and appearance. Sprawl-Busters, Planners OK Innovative Cap 
on Floor Size (Oct. 8, 2004), at http://www.sprawl-busters.com/search. 
php?readstory=1502. In Los Angeles, the City Council issued a preliminary 
approval vote of a zoning ordinance which would require economic impact 
studies of any store over 100,000 square feet. Sprawl-Busters, City Council 
Takes First Vote on Big Box Impact Ordinance (Aug. 10, 2004), at 
http://www.sprawl-busters.com/search.php?readstory=1499. 
101 Anita French, Smaller Supercenters in Wal-Mart’s Future, MORNING 
NEWS, Nov. 11, 2004, available at http://www.nwaonline.net/articles/ 
2004/11/04/wal_-_mart/77wmurban.txt. Wal-Mart calls their 99,000 square foot 
model the “Urban 99” prototype. Id. Although the company insists that the 
model was developed to fit better into urban areas, an industry analyst believes 
that the decision was due in part to zoning ordinances blocking stores of more 
than 100,000 square feet in size. Id. 
102 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (Supp. V. 1964). The statute states: 
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encourage the federal government and its agencies to engage in 
environmentally-sound decision making.103 In relevant part, NEPA 
requires that the policies, regulations, and laws of the nation be 
interpreted and administered in conjunction with the federal 
policies outlined in the statute.104 Specifically, NEPA requires that 
all federal agencies consider the environmental ramifications of 
their actions through the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach 
to decision making and the submission of detailed reports on the 
potential environmental effects of any proposed action.105 
                                                          
[I]t is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation 
with State and local governments, and other concerned public and 
private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, 
including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to 
foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive 
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of 
present and future generations of Americans. 
Id. § 4331(a). 
103 Todd Gregory Monahan, Seeking the Spirit of SEQRA From Beneath the 
Paperwork, 65 ALB. L. REV. 539, 542 (2001) (discussing how NEPA the 
commitment of the federal government towards preservation and consideration 
of the environment). 
104 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
105 Id. The statute directs all federal agencies to: 
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure 
the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the 
environmental design arts in planning and in decision making which 
may have an impact on man’s environment; (B) identify and develop 
methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on 
Environmental Quality established by subchapter II of this chapter, 
which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities 
and values may be given appropriate consideration in decision making 
along with economic and technical considerations; (C) include in every 
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major 
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—(i) 
the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse 
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the 
relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and 
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) 
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Many states followed in Congress’s footsteps and enacted their 
own environmental review statutes.106 These state statutes vary in 
scope and form, but most share NEPA’s goal of injecting 
environmental considerations into each land use decision made at 
the government level.107 The state of Vermont, for example, 
enacted a statute that allows the state to consider the potential 
economic impacts of proposed development under the rubric of 
environmental review.108 New York has a purely environmental 
review statute that seeks to achieve similar objectives.109 State 
environmental review statutes have frequently been invoked for the 
purpose of monitoring, controlling, and mitigating the 
environmental effects of industrialization and development.110 The 
success of efforts to curb development often rests on the 
interpretation of these statutes by state courts, especially with 
regard to the meaning of the term “environment.”111 This section 
explores the intersection of federal, state, and city environmental 
law and the applicability of these statutes to challenges brought 
                                                          
any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which 
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
Id. 
106 As of 2004, fifteen states and the District of Columbia had their own 
NEPA-type environment impact review statute. David Sive & Mark A. Chertok, 
“Little NEPAs” And Their Environmental Impact Assessment Processes, SJ101 
ALI-ABA 1013, 1015 (2004). 
107 See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (Supp. V 1964) (NEPA encourages agencies to 
incorporate environmental review into their decision-making processes); N.Y. 
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 2004). New York’s 
state counterpart to NEPA encourages environmentally aware policy making. Id. 
108 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (2004). See also infra Section 
IIIB for a discussion of Act 250 and cases litigating its provisions. 
109 See infra note 161. 
110 See James Murphy, Vermont’s Act 250 and the Problem of Sprawl, 9 
ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 205 (2004) (The author notes that sprawl and 
related development can have impacts on the environment such as: an increase 
in air pollution due to increased automobile traffic; destruction of the physical 
environment; worsened water quality due to runoff; and effects upon 
groundwater). 
111 See e.g. Chinese Staff and Workers Ass’n v. City of New York, 68 
N.Y.2d 359 (1986) (construing the term “environment” broadly, benefiting anti-
development advocates). 
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against development by large national retailers. 
A. Intersection of New York State and New York City 
Environmental Law 
Building on the foundation laid by NEPA, New York enacted 
the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) in 1976.112 
In enacting SEQRA, the state legislature sought to establish a 
consistent statewide policy of incorporating environmental 
consequences and public participation into the decision-making 
processes of governmental agencies.113 The legislature also sought 
to promote efforts that promised to “prevent or eliminate damage 
to the environment and enhance human and community 
resources.”114 SEQRA’s prescriptions are more demanding than 
those of NEPA, given that the statute requires not only procedural 
compliance but also substantive compliance.115 The statute 
                                                          
112 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 2004). In 
relevant part, SEQRA provides that: 
Agencies shall use all practicable means to realize the policies and 
goals set forth in this article, and shall act and choose alternatives 
which, consistent with social, economic and other essential 
considerations, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize or avoid 
adverse environmental effects, including effects revealed in the 
environmental impact statement process. 
Id. § 8-0109(1). 
113 Monahan, supra note 103, at 543 (describing how SEQRA shares 
similar policy goals with NEPA). See Philip Weinberg, SEQRA: Effective 
Weapon—If Used As Directed, 65 ALB. L. REV. 315 (2001) [hereinafter 
Effective Weapon] (noting that SEQRA has “furnished an absolutely vital 
fulcrum from which the public can participate in—and if necessary challenge—
decisions inflicting environmental impacts on local communities”). 
114 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101. 
115 See Monahan, supra note 103, at 544 (NEPA stipulates that once an 
agency has procedurally complied with the statute’s requirements, a court may 
not interject within the decision-making process. However, SEQRA requires not 
only “environmentally sound decision-making,” but also “the creation of 
environmentally sound policy”) (emphasis added); Kathryn C. Plunkett, 
Comment, Local Environmental Impact Review: Integrating Land Use and 
Environmental Planning Through Local Environmental Impact Reviews, 20 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 211, 216 (2002) (“SEQRA goes beyond NEPA and 
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mandates that state and city agencies and legislative bodies 
conduct environmental analyses before undertaking any project or 
activity, or engaging in policy, regulation, or procedure making.116 
New York City has adopted SEQRA and extended the 
application of the statute to its own agencies through the City 
Environmental Quality Review (CEQR).117 SEQRA and CEQR 
require that agencies act to “minimize or avoid adverse 
environmental effects,” and require the preparation of an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) when an initial review 
process reveals that a project “may have a significant effect on the 
environment.”118 An EIS is a detailed statement that must contain a 
description of the proposed project, the project’s environmental 
impacts, any adverse environmental effects posed by the 
development, alternatives to the proposed action, and an evaluation 
of additional considerations listed within SEQRA.119 
Given that the SEQRA review process centers on the 
evaluation of environmental impacts posed by development 
projects, judicial interpretation of the word “environment” is 
critical.120 SEQRA defines “environment” as “the physical 
conditions which will be affected by a proposed action, including 
land, air, water, minerals, flora, fauna, noise, objects of historic or 
aesthetic significance, existing patterns of population 
concentration, distribution, or growth, and existing community or 
neighborhood character.”121 
In Chinese Staff & Workers Ass’n v. City of New York,122 the 
plaintiff association challenged the sufficiency of the state’s 
                                                          
imposes substantive requirements on agencies.”). 
116 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(4) (defining agency “action”). 
117 See City of New York Exec. Order No. 91, CEQR (Aug. 24, 1977) and 
the current CEQR rules, Rules of the City of New York tit. 62, ch. 5 (1991). 
118 See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1); Id. § 8-0109(2) (setting 
forth situations that require the preparation of an environmental impact 
statement). 
119 Id. § 8-0109(2)(a)-(j). 
120 See Chinese Staff and Workers Ass’n v. City of New York, 68 N.Y.2d 
359 (1986). 
121 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 8-0105 (6). 
122 68 N.Y.2d 359 (1986). 
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environmental review model and argued that the City Planning 
Department’s limited interpretation of the term “environment” was 
contrary to the meaning and purpose of SEQRA and CEQR.123 
Specifically, the plaintiff association contested the construction of 
a high-rise building on an empty lot in Chinatown.124 In order to 
comply with SEQRA regulations, the project’s developers had 
previously submitted an application for a special permit to the 
city’s Department of City Planning and its Department of 
Environmental Protection.125 After reviewing relevant 
environmental considerations, the agencies granted the 
development permit without requiring the preparation of a draft 
EIS.126 The plaintiff association challenged the approval of the 
permit and argued that the city agencies’ environmental review 
was “arbitrary and capricious because of the failure of the lead 
agencies to consider whether the introduction of luxury housing 
into the Chinatown community would accelerate the displacement 
of local low-income residents and businesses or alter the character 
of the community.”127 
The New York Court of Appeals agreed that a permit should 
not have been granted without further review.128 The court held 
that when deciding whether to require the preparation of an EIS, a 
lead agency must consider all possible environmental effects, 
whether physical, social, or economic, in order to comply with 
SEQRA.129 The Court of Appeals noted that although a project 
might be small in physical scope, it still might have a large impact 
on the surrounding community.130 Under the interpretation set 
forth in Chinese Staff, SEQRA and CEQR require agencies to 
                                                          
123 Id. at 365. The City Planning Department argued that since the effects 
argued by the plaintiffs are not ones that “impinge upon the physical 
environment in a significant manner,” they are outside the scope of the word 
“environment” as used in SEQRA. Id. 
124 Id. at 362. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 363. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 366. 
130 Id. at 367. 
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inspect the possibility that a proposed project will cause the long-
term displacement of residents and businesses in determining 
whether the project will have a significant effect on the 
environment.131 
B. Environmental Law as a Tool For Smart Retail 
Development 
The broad reach of SEQRA and other environmental review 
statutes permits environmental advocates to challenge proposed 
development projects based on their anticipated negative 
consequences for the environment.132 Although SEQRA permits 
consideration of community or neighborhood character within its 
environmental analysis, New York courts have stopped short of 
expressly allowing agencies to consider a project’s potential 
impact on competition.133 The ability to force agency evaluation of 
a project’s impact on competition is a boon to anti-“big box retail” 
                                                          
131 Id. at 368. The court determined that its holding was: 
limited to a determination that existing patterns of population 
concentration, distribution or growth and existing community or 
neighborhood character are physical conditions such that the 
regulations adopted by the City of New York pursuant to SEQRA 
require an agency to consider the potential long-term secondary 
displacement of residents and businesses in determining whether a 
proposed project may have a significant effect on the environment. 
Id. 
132 See Monahan, supra note 103, at 540-41 (Since SEQRA requires 
adverse environmental impacts to be assessed earlier on in the process than 
NEPA, SEQRA has the potential “to be a powerful action-forcing environmental 
law in New York.”). 
133 See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 8-0105(6); Chinese Staff, 68 N.Y.2d at 
366 (allowing for consideration of neighborhood and community character); 
East Coast Development Co. v. Kay, 667 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996). In 
this case, the court determined that the economic effects of a proposed store on 
the existing downtown retailers could not be the sole support for the city 
planning board’s SEQRA-based decision. Id. at 184. Although the court 
ultimately determined that there was additional support for the board’s 
determination, it warned localities not to couch economics-based development 
decisions in the language of SEQRA. Id. at 184-85. 
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advocates.134 The state of Vermont, placed on the National Trust 
for Historic Preservation’s “endangered list” due to rampant retail 
development, recognized this opportunity and adopted an 
aggressive statutory stance against unwanted retail development 
within its borders.135 The state enacted the first version of Act 
250136 in 1970, creating a growth-management statute that 
prioritizes community participation in land-use planning decisions, 
with a particular emphasis on concerns about the environment, 
including the small business sector.137 The statute provides for 
joint local and state involvement in the permitting process.138 A 
developer seeking an Act 250 development permit must first apply 
to the appropriate district commission.139 The commission then 
holds evidentiary hearings in which all interested parties, including 
private citizens, may participate.140 The board considers testimony 
and evidence from the hearing as well as the criteria set forth in 
Act 250 in determining whether to grant the development 
                                                          
134 When the environmental review process allows parties to present 
evidence that proposed development would have a negative economic impact on 
the community it benefits small business owners. See infra notes 139-151 and 
accompanying text. 
135 See NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, AMERICA’S 11 
MOST ENDANGERED HISTORIC PLACES (2004) available at 
http://www.nationaltrust.org/11most/2004/index.html (placing the entire state of 
Vermont on this list for the second time since 1990 due to the “invasion” of 
Wal-Marts into the state). 
136 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (2004). 
137 Weiss, supra note 10, at 33. Vermont’s Act 250 seeks to involve 
individuals in the land-use planning process through local meetings and 
evidentiary hearings, creating a shift in the power dynamic of planning. Id. at 
33-34. In Vermont, the land-use planning process requires attention paid and 
priority given to the environmental impacts of proposed projects. Id. at 42. See 
Sherry Keymer Dreisewerd, Staving Off the Pillage of the Village: Does In Re 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Offer Hope to Small Merchants Struggling for Economic 
Survival Against Box Retailers? 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 323, 325 
(1998) (noting the extensive capabilities of Act 250 to slow or stop 
development). 
138 Id. at 330 (describing how Act 250 is unique because it provides for 
concurrent control by both state and local governments). 
139 Id. at 332. 
140 Murphy, supra note 110 (describing the Act 250 review process). 
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permit.141 
In 1997, the Vermont Supreme Court unanimously upheld a 
decision by the state Environmental Board that denied a state land 
use permit request by Wal-Mart, Inc.142 In In re Wal-Mart, Wal-
Mart sought to build a store two miles from the historic town 
center of St. Albans, Vermont.143 Based on its findings that Wal-
Mart’s entrance into the St. Albans community would negatively 
affect the town’s tax base and its smaller downtown retailers, the 
Environmental Board denied Wal-Mart’s permit application.144 
The Vermont Supreme Court upheld the decision.145 The 
Environmental Board and the Vermont Supreme Court concluded 
that a project’s potential effects on market competition can justify 
the denial of a development permit within the scope of an 
environmental impact analysis.146 
Environmental review statutes are an important factor in the 
realm of retail development, both for opponents and developers.147 
                                                          
141 Id. 
142 See In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 167 Vt. 75 (1997). 
143 Dreisewerd, supra note 137, at 336. 
144 In re Wal-Mart Stores, 167 Vt. at 78 (noting that this case is an appeal 
from a previous denial of a permit by the Environmental Board). 
145 Id. at 87. See Dreisewerd, supra note 137, at 338 (stating that the 
Environmental Board decided that the extent to which a proposed development 
might have a substantial adverse economic impact on existing businesses is a 
relevant criteria under Act 250); Roper & Humstone, supra note 2, at 762. Wal-
Mart argued that Act 250 was only concerned with physical and environmental 
impact, but the Supreme Court found that Criteria 9(A) and 9(H) explicitly 
require consideration of economic impacts of development. Id. Criterion 9(A) 
requires consideration of the community’s financial ability to absorb new 
development. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(9)(A). Criterion 9(H) requires 
consideration of the costs to the community of the development, including 
balancing increase to tax base with costs of employment and education. VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(9)(H). 
146 In re Wal-Mart Stores, 167 Vt. at 82 (determining that the 
Environmental Board properly considered the financial ability and capacity of a 
town to absorb a development project as a valid consideration under Act 250). 
147 See Chinese Staff and Workers Ass’n v. City of New York, 68 N.Y.2d 
359 (1986). This case is a good example of anti-development advocate use of 
SEQRA to block development. Id.; Adam L. Wekstein & Geraldine N. 
Tortorella, Navigating the Land Use and Zoning Minefield, 466 PRAC. L. INST. 
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SEQRA’s consideration of the impact of development projects on 
neighborhood character and Act 250’s emphasis on environmental 
considerations open the door for future challenges by residents and 
small business owners who seek to slow or halt the expansion of 
large national retailers.148 
IV. ANTITRUST LAW 
Antitrust law exists as an annex to the traditional areas of law 
used to challenge retail development. The goal of federal antitrust 
law is to protect competition.149 Despite this seemingly simple 
goal, federal antitrust law targets a variety of corporate behavior.150 
At the federal level, three principal antitrust statutes operate to 
protect competition: the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and Federal 
Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).151 Each of these statutes has a 
different purpose and plays a different role in federal antitrust 
litigation. 
In 1890, facing a new wave of corporate consolidation in the 
railroad industry and a variety of corporate combinations, 
                                                          
19 (warning attorneys who practice in land use about the varied ways 
environmental review statutes impact the practice of land use law). 
148 See Chinese Staff, 68 N.Y.2d at 359 (solidifying the validity of 
considering a proposed action’s impact on neighborhood and community 
character under SEQRA); In re Wal-Mart, 167 Vt. at 81 (recognizing that the 
financial impacts of a retailer’s entrance into the local economy is a valid 
consideration under Act 250). 
149 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER 
(2004) [hereinafter ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER], at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/div_stats/9142.htm (stating that “antitrust laws 
protect competition”). 
150 Id. The Sherman Act “outlaws all contracts, combinations and 
conspiracies that unreasonably restrain interstate and foreign trade,” specifically 
ones that suppress competition with “anticompetitive conduct.” Id. The Clayton 
Act prohibits “mergers or acquisitions that are likely to lessen competition.” Id. 
The Federal Trade Commission Act “prohibits unfair methods of competition in 
interstate commerce.” Id. 
151 See William H. Borghesani, Jr. et al, Food for Thought: The Emergence 
of Power Buyers and Its Challenge to Competition Analysis, 4 STAN. J.L. BUS. 
& FIN. 39, 69 (1999) (noting and naming the three main federal antitrust 
statutes). 
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Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act.152 The Sherman Act 
prohibits “every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign 
nations.”153 In an attempt to further protect competition during the 
economic surge that preceded the Great Depression, Congress 
amended the Sherman Act in 1914 to include the Clayton Act.154 
The Clayton Act’s provisions authorize the government to review 
and regulate mergers and other transactions that may lessen 
competition or “tend to create a monopoly.”155 Congress passed the 
third major statute, the FTC Act, in 1914.156 With a broader reach 
than the other statutes, the FTC Act prohibits “unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in or affecting commerce.”157 
Although not part of the trilogy, a fourth antitrust statute 
operates specifically to protect small businesses.158 In 1936, 
Congress adopted the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA) as a 
modification of the existing Clayton Act. 159 The RPA reflects 
congressional concern that the influx and spread of chain stores 
across the United States would destroy competition because small 
                                                          
152 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). See Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: 
Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 6 
(2003) (stating that Congress was motivated by the environment of trusts in 
business when drafting the Sherman Act); George J. Stigler, The Origin of the 
Sherman Act, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT 32 (E. 
Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991) (noting that interest in a federal anti-monopoly act 
arose in the wake of complaints regarding raising railroad rates and “flourishing 
industrial trusts”). 
153 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
154 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-14, 19, 21, 22 and 27 (2004). 
155 15 U.S.C. § 18. Additional provisions of the Clayton Act govern a 
variety of vertical restrictions that may serve to harm competition. See 15 
U.S.C.A. § 14; ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER., supra note 149 
(noting that the Clayton Act also “prohibits other business practices that under 
certain circumstances may harm competition). 
156 15 U.S.C. §§ 42-58 (2004). 
157 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
158 See David J. Kates, Recouping the Losses of Brooke Group, 73 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 609, 613 (1995) (noting that the RPA “was designed principally to 
afford market protection to small businesses”). 
159 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (West 2004). 
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businesses would be unable to compete with the lower prices of 
chain stores.160 The RPA makes it unlawful for “any person 
engaged in commerce . . . to sell, or contract to sell, goods at 
unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition 
or eliminating a competitor.”161 The RPA prohibition against price 
discrimination thus provides small businesses with a legal means 
of challenging the practices of large national retailers.162 
A. Federal Antitrust Litigation 
Following the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936, 
plaintiffs were able to successfully challenge predatory pricing 
structures under the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts.163 In 
1967, the U.S. Supreme Court heard and decided one such 
challenge in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.164 Based in 
Salt Lake City, Utah Pie Company brought suit against Continental 
Baking Company and other similarly-situated baking companies 
for violations under the Sherman Act and section 2(a) of the 
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.165 Utah Pie 
                                                          
160 See Kates, supra note 158, at 613. 
161 15 U.S.C. § 13a (2004). 
162 See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) 
(challenging primary line price discrimination under the RPA); Lepage’s Inc. v. 
3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2003) (finding for a plaintiff medium-size office 
supplies manufacturer who alleged predatory pricing in the form of loyalty 
rebates issued by 3M to retailers). 
163 See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). 
164 386 U.S. 685 (1967). 
165 Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 687. Plaintiffs also charged a conspiracy among 
the defendants under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. The relevant language 
from §2(a) of the Clayton Act provides: 
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the 
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate 
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and 
quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such 
discrimination are in commerce . . . where the effect of such 
discrimination may be substantially lessen competition or tend to create 
a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent 
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives 
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them. 
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alleged that the defendants had sold frozen pies in the “Salt Lake 
Market at prices lower than it sold pies of like grade and quality in 
other markets considerably closer to its plants” in an effort to 
destroy competition from the Utah Pie Company in violation of the 
RPA’s ban on price discrimination.166 Overturning the lower court, 
the Supreme Court accepted the plaintiffs’ arguments and gave 
broad reach to the language of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman 
Acts.167 The Court concluded that the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals had incorrectly decided that the anti-competitive evidence 
proffered by Utah Pie Company was insufficient to present to a 
jury.168 The Court also rejected the defendants’ proffered cost 
justification defense.169 The Supreme Court held that the language 
of predatory intent found in Continental Baking Company 
memoranda outweighed the company’s defense of cost 
justification and established evidence sufficient to present to a 
jury.170 
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court decided its first predatory 
pricing case since Utah Pie and exhibited new skepticism toward 
plaintiffs alleging the existence of below-cost pricing schemes.171 
In Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco,172 the plaintiff 
cigarette manufacturer alleged that the defendant manufacturer’s 
competitive pricing strategies were designed to suppress the 
plaintiff’s prices and thus violated section 13(a) of the Robinson-
                                                          
15 U.S.C. §13(a). 
166 386 U.S. at 690. 
167 Id. at 703. (“We believe that the Act reaches price discrimination that 
erodes competition as much as it does price discrimination that is intended to 
have immediate destructive impact.”). 
168 Id. at 704. 
169 Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 697-702 (writing in note 14 of its opinion, the 
Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ argument that Utah Pie’s dominance 
within the market justified their drastic price cuts). 
170 Id. at 696-97. 
171 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 
U.S. 209 (1993); Donald J. Boudreaux et al., The Supreme Court’s Predation 
Odyssey: From Fruit Pies to Cigarettes, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 57 (1995) 
(noting that the Brooke Group decision demonstrates the court’s “heightened 
skepticism towards claims of predatory pricing”). 
172 509 U.S. 209. 
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Patman Act.173 The Supreme Court found for the defendant 
manufacturer and implemented a higher evidentiary standard for 
future predatory pricing plaintiffs.174 The majority established a 
two-part test for price discrimination that requires plaintiffs to set 
forth evidence of below-cost pricing as well as the probability that 
the competitor will be able to recoup its losses.175 The Court stated 
that “[r]ecoupment is the ultimate object of an unlawful predatory 
pricing scheme; it is the means by which a predator profits from 
predation.”176 Justice Stevens argued in his dissent, however, that 
the majority’s pro-consumer rationale was misguided.177 He 
asserted that although price cutting is a competitive practice that 
lowers prices and saves money for consumers, the practice 
destroys competition and harms consumers once prices fall below 
the retailer’s cost.178 
 
                                                          
173 Id. at 216 (The plaintiff alleged “illegal price discrimination between 
Brown & Williamson’s full-priced branded cigarettes and its low-priced 
generics.”). 
174 See Kates, supra note 158, at 628-29; Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 230-31 
(admitting that the plaintiff’s theory of defendant’s liability is within the reach 
of the statute, but depends too much upon a “complex chain of cause and effect” 
to constitute a violation of the statute). In order to succeed, a plaintiff must show 
1) that the defendant set prices below some measure of cost and 2) that the 
defendant has a “reasonable prospect” or “dangerous probability” of recouping 
his losses. Id. at 223-24. The second element that must be proved by a plaintiff 
changes depending upon whether the suit is brought under the Sherman or 
Robinson-Patman Act. The standard under the Robinson-Patman Act is a 
“reasonable prospect” and the standard under the Sherman Act is a “dangerous 
probability.” Id. at 224. 
175 509 U.S. at 222-27 (discussing the two prerequisites for recovery for a 
price discrimination plaintiff). First, a plaintiff must prove that his rival’s 
challenged prices are below “an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs.” Id. at 
222. Next, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the rival had a “reasonable 
prospect” of “recouping its investment in below-cost prices.” Id. at 224. The 
court emphasized the important of proving recoupment since without it, 
consumer welfare would be improved since prices had been lowered. Id. at 224. 
176 Id. at 224. 
177 Id. at 256 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
178 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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B. State Antitrust Litigation as a Tool to Protect Small 
Businesses 
Small businesses have had greater success as antitrust plaintiffs 
in suits brought under state unfair business practices statutes.179 
Although a state statute cannot preempt federal legislation, it can 
supplement it.180 As a result, states may proscribe a broader array 
of behavior and make it easier for plaintiffs to prove violations.181 
Many antitrust statutes are modeled after and contain language 
nearly identical to the Clayton and Sherman Acts.182 Unlike federal 
legislation, however, these statutes often include a specific, 
                                                          
179 See American Booksellers Assn., Inc. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 135 
F.Supp.2d 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that “secret” discounts received by 
defendants are actionable under California Unfair Trade Practices Act); Star 
Fuel Marts v. Murphy Oil USA, No. Civ.-02-202-F, 2003 WL 742191 (W.D. 
Okla. Jan. 29, 2003) (holding that below-cost pricing by defendant gas station 
was actionable under Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act). 
180 Wal-Mart Stores v. American Drugs, 319 Ark. 214, 233-34 (1995) 
(Niblock, J., dissenting) (citing to the preemption test established by Capital 
Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984)). The dissent notes that Capital Cities 
Cable Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984), established the controlling test for 
determining whether federal legislation preempts a state statute. Id. The Court in 
Capital Cities evaluated the existence of preemption based on four factors: 
[w]hether Congress expressed a clear intent to preempt state law; 
whether Congress occupies the field so as to leave no room for the 
states to supplement; whether compliance with both the state and 
federal laws is impossible; and whether the state law stands as an 
obstacle to Congress’ objective or purpose. 
Wal-Mart Stores, 319 Ark. at 233 (citing Capital Cities, 467 U.S. 691). 
181 Wal-Mart Stores, 319 Ark. at 233. The preemption test in Capital Cities 
Cable v. Crisp allows state statutes to co-exist with federal legislation so long as 
Congress did not express an intent to preempt state law, the federal legislation 
leaves no room for the state statute to exist, compliance with both state and 
federal law is possible, and the state law does not stand as an obstacle to 
Congress’ objective or purpose. Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 
(1984). 
182 See James R. McCall, Private Enforcement of Predatory Price Laws 
Under the California Unlawful Practices Act and the Federal Antitrust Acts, 28 
PAC. L.J. 311 (1997) (comparing the California UPA and counterpart federal 
legislation and noting that the language of the two are very similar, but the 
California statute has a broader scope). 
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plaintiff-friendly definition of “cost” and proscribe a wide range of 
predatory pricing behavior.183 
As noted by legal scholars, a statute’s definition of “cost” or 
the court’s interpretation of the same concept often determines the 
fate of an antitrust plaintiff.184 In federal antitrust litigation, before 
a plaintiff can proceed, he must first prove that the defendant 
priced its products below cost.185 Thus, although cost can be a 
difficult and expensive concept for a plaintiff to determine, it is 
essential to below-cost pricing litigation.186 Federal law and the 
U.S. Supreme Court, however, have been silent with respect to the 
definition of “cost.”187 In practice, the two most common methods 
used to determine a defendant’s costs are “average variable cost” 
(AVC) and “average total cost” (ATC).188 Designed by two law 
professors, the AVC standard does not account for the fixed costs 
of the seller and instead divides the total avoidable costs by the 
number of units produced.189 In this case, a price above AVC 
                                                          
183 See id. (stating that the California statute’s definition of “cost” makes it 
easier for plaintiffs to prevail and that the California statute has a broader 
scope). 
184 See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223 (failing to create a definitive 
standard for determining “cost”); Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: 
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2253 (2000) (noting that 
plaintiff’s success rate in predatory pricing cases in the era preceding the Brooke 
Group decision depended on what calculation of “cost” a court used). Typically, 
to an economist, “cost” actually represents the concept of “total costs”, 
“meaning all costs incurred to produce the item including labor, materials, 
overhead, or any other type of cost.” McCall, supra note 182, at 316. 
185 Brooke Group, 209 U.S. at 222. 
186 See Bolton, supra note 184, at 2271 (arguing that even though cost is a 
complicated concept, since 1975 courts have “followed a cost standard in 
evaluating predatory pricing”). 
187 See id. at 2255 (noting that the Brooke Group Court did not adopt a 
specific definition of “cost” for its predatory pricing test). 
188 See McCall, supra note 182 at 317-24 for a complete discussion of the 
different cost concepts. 
189 Id. at 318. Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner believe that 
since a seller cannot avoid the fixed costs of production, these should not be 
included in a calculation of his costs. Id. (citing Phillip Areeda & Donald F. 
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700 (1975)). “Fixed costs are those that do 
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would be presumptively nonpredatory and one below AVC would 
be presumptively predatory.190 The ATC standard, by contrast, 
divides the total of all costs by the number of units produced.191 By 
including the fixed costs that the AVC standard omits, the ATC 
method yields a higher number, making it easier for a plaintiff to 
point to a product’s price and show that it is “below cost.” 
State antitrust legislation often proves advantageous to 
plaintiffs, given that it provides a specific definition of cost to 
assist courts in determining whether defendants are engaged in 
below-cost pricing.192 For example, the California Unlawful 
Practices Act (UPA) and Unfair Competition Act (UCA), and the 
Arkansas Unfair Practices Act define cost using the average total 
cost standard.193 By defining cost as average total cost, these 
statutes account for even the manufacturer’s fixed costs.194 The 
ATC standard for calculating costs results in a higher value than 
the AVC standard and thus makes it easier for predatory pricing 
plaintiffs to prove that a manufacturer priced items below cost.195 
In addition to including specific, plaintiff-friendly definitions 
of cost, state statutes may also proscribe a broader array of 
corporate behavior.196 Two comprehensive examples of state 
antitrust legislation are the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act and the 
                                                          
not vary with output and typically include management expenses, depreciation, 
property costs, and other irreducible outlays.” Bolton, supra note 184, at 316. 
190 Bolton, supra note 184, at 318. 
191 Id. at 316. 
192 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (West 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-201 – 217 
(b)(1) (Michie 2004). 
193 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17026 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 17029 (West 2004) (defining manufacturing costs); ARK. CODE ANN. § 
4-75-209(b)(1). 
194 See supra note 189 for a discussion of fixed costs and their impact on 
predatory pricing situations. 
195 See Bolton, supra note 184, at 316 (by defining a company’s 
manufacturing costs expansively, statutes like California’s make it easier for 
plaintiffs to prove a violation by below-cost pricing). 
196 For instance, the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act and the California UPA 
both prohibit the use of “loss leaders,” a practice that is not prohibited by federal 
antitrust law. See infra notes 197-202. 
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California UPA and UCA.197 Unlike their federal counterparts, the 
Oklahoma and California statutes have broad provisions 
prohibiting the use of “loss leaders” in competition and, in turn, 
create a more favorable legal environment for small business 
plaintiffs.198 Each statute provides a similar, specific definition of 
“loss leader.” The California statute defines “loss leader” as: 
any article or product sold at less than cost: (a) Where the 
purpose is to induce, promote, or encourage the purchase of 
other merchandise; or (b) Where the effect is a tendency or 
capacity to mislead or deceive purchasers or prospective 
purchasers; or (c) Where the effect is to divert trade from or 
otherwise injure competition.199 
Loss leader provisions target retailers who lure customers into 
their stores with below-cost prices, destroy favorable competition, 
and prey on the gullibility of consumers.200 These provisions rest 
on the premise that a customer who visits a store because of 
advertised loss leader prices will expect all other items in the store 
to be similarly priced, although they often are not.201 Thus, loss 
leader pricing projects an overall image to the public that a store 
contains bargain-priced merchandise, harming smaller competitors 
who are unable to mimic below-cost pricing.202 
                                                          
197 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 598.1-598.11 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-
17210 (West 2004). 
198 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 598.3 (prohibiting use of loss leaders); 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17044 (prohibiting use of loss leaders). These 
statutes contrast with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, which do not include loss 
leader pricing as a proscribed business practice. See Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger 
Co., 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1968). In Hiland, the District Court found that the 
plaintiff’s assertion that defendant used loss leader selling tactics was 
insufficient to assert a successful claim under the Sherman Act. Id. The court 
determined that the purpose of the Sherman Act was to prevent monopolization 
and that loss leader tactics rarely lead to monopolization in a field. Id. at 975. 
199 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17030. 
200 Safeway Stores Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass’n, 360 U.S. 334, 
340 (1959). 
201 Id. at 340. 
202 Star Fuel Marts v. Murphy Oil USA, No. Civ.-02-202-F, 2003 WL 
742191 at *7-*8 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 29, 2003) (noting that a gap in advertised 
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Plaintiffs have experienced mixed success challenging large 
national retailers under state unfair practices statutes. In 1995, the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas decided Wal-Mart Stores v. American 
Drugs and determined that plaintiffs challenging below-cost sales 
by Wal-Mart did not make their case under the Arkansas Unfair 
Practices Act.203 The Arkansas UPA requires a plaintiff to show 
that below-cost sales were made “for the purpose of injuring 
competitors and destroying competition.”204 The Arkansas 
Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs did not present 
sufficient evidence from which the court could infer this intent.205 
Since the Arkansas statute does not prohibit loss leaders, Wal-
Mart’s strategy of selling alternating items below cost for varied 
periods of time does not violate the statute absent evidence of 
intent to injure or destroy competition.206 
In 2003, a federal district court in Oklahoma issued an 
injunction in Star Fuel Marts v. Murphy Oil USA to enjoin Sam’s 
Club gasoline stations from selling fuel at prices below cost in 
violation of the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act.207 The evidence 
presented by the plaintiff service stations showed that, for eight 
months, the Sam’s Club gas stations in question had operated at a 
                                                          
prices between competitors leaves consumers with the image that the higher-
priced competitor is “gouging”). 
203 Wal-Mart Stores v. American Drugs, 319 Ark. 214, 216 (1995). The two 
plaintiffs, owners of small pharmacies, alleged that Wal-Mart “was selling 
individual items below cost for the purpose of injuring competitors and 
destroying competition in violation of § 4-75-209(a)(1) of the Act.” Id. at 216. 
204 ARK. STAT. § 4-75-209(a)(1). 
205 Wal-Mart Stores, 319 Ark. at 220 (noting that “the individual items sold 
below cost, the frequency of those sales, the duration of those sales, and the 
extent of such sales are not revealed in the chancery court’s opinion”). 
206 Id. at 221. The court determined that the circumstantial evidence 
presented was not enough to establish a violation of the Act in the absence of 
some legislative action to outlaw the use of loss leaders. Id. at 224-25. It is 
notable that in the wake of this decision, the Arkansas legislature did not take 
any steps to outlaw the use of loss leaders. ARK. STAT. § 4-75-209. 
207 Star Fuel Marts, 2003 WL 742191, at *15 (granting entry of a 
preliminary injunction). The federal district court had jurisdiction over this case 
because the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act allows a plaintiff to bring a suit in any 
court of “equitable jurisdiction.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 15 § 598.5(a). Sam’s Club is a 
subsidiary of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Star Fuel Marts, 2003 WL 742191, at *1. 
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significant loss.208 Although the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act 
requires evidence of a defendant’s intent to injure competition, in 
contrast to the Arkansas Unfair Practices Act, the Oklahoma 
statute allows a plaintiff to introduce evidence of below-cost sales 
as “prima facie evidence of intent to injure competitors and to 
destroy or substantially lessen competition.”209 The below-cost 
pricing constituted prima facie evidence for the plaintiffs, and the 
defendants’ internal management manual discussing the objectives 
of their plan completed the inference.210 The court concluded that 
the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to support the 
granting of a preliminary injunction prohibiting Sam’s Club gas 
stations from selling gasoline below cost.211 
C. New York’s Statute 
New York enacted its current antitrust statute in 1909.212 The 
Donnelly Antitrust Act created a private right of action for any 
party injured by actions that restrain trade or create monopolistic 
market conditions.213 The Donnelly Act stipulates that: 
[e]very contract, agreement, arrangement or combination 
whereby . . . [c]ompetition or the free exercise of any 
activity in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce 
or in the furnishing of any service in this state is or may be 
restrained or whereby [f]or the purpose of establishing or 
maintaining any such monopoly . . . is hereby declared to 
be against public policy, illegal and void.214 
New York’s attorneys general have invoked the Donnelly Act 
in a variety of situations. For example, the state prevailed in 
litigation against a dominant software corporation for alleged 
                                                          
208 Star Fuel Marts, 2003 WL 742191, at *5 (over eight months, the 
stations in question operated at a loss of $250,000). 
209 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15 § 598.5(c). See Star Fuel Marts, 2003 WL 742191, 
at *10 (discussing this statutory provision). 
210 Id. at *12. 
211 Id. at *15. 
212 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 340-347 (McKinney 2004). 
213 Id. § 340. 
214 Id. 
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monopolization215 as well as against two hospitals for 
inappropriate merger activity within the healthcare industry.216 
However, the Donnelly Act does not include any provisions similar 
to those embodied by section 2 of the Sherman Act or the 
Robinson-Patman Act. Although New York State’s antitrust 
enforcement department is considered among the most active in 
the country, the department is limited in practical focus and 
concentrates primarily on monopolistic behavior rather than price 
discrimination or below-cost pricing schemes.217 
Beginning in 1964, the New York Attorney General’s Office 
began to garner positive attention for its antitrust prosecutions.218 
During the last forty years, the New York Attorney General has 
been involved in a variety of cases brought under the Donnelly Act 
and, at times, jointly under state and federal legislation.219 These 
                                                          
215 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
Even though the case was tried in District Court in Washington, D.C., New 
York was a named plaintiff in the suit and alleged violations of New York 
antitrust statutes. Id. 
216 See New York v. St. Francis Hosp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(involving allegations that two hospitals were participating in what the court 
termed a “virtual merger” in violation of the Sherman Act). For an in-depth look 
at New York antitrust activity and litigation, see Harry First, Delivering 
Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1004, 1019-25 (2001). The Attorney General of the New York State and 
private citizens and businesses share the power to enforce antitrust statutes. 
OFFICE OF NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL ELIOT SPITZER, ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK (2004), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/ 
business/antitrust.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). The Office of the Attorney 
General possesses the power to investigate and prosecute violations of both state 
and federal antitrust law. Id. 
217 See First, supra note 216, at 1016 (describing the prosecutions of the 
New York antitrust bureau). 
218 See Philip Weinberg, Office of N.Y. Attorney General Sets Pace for 
Others Nationwide, 76- JUN. N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 11 (2004) (noting that “[b]y 1964, 
the National Association of Attorneys General was to note that New York was 
the most active state in the antitrust field”); First, supra note 216, at 1016 
(describing how New York is “generally considered to have one of the more 
active state antitrust enforcement agencies”). 
219 See Edward D. Cavanagh, New York Antitrust Bureau Pursues Mandate 
to Represent State Interests in Fostering Competitive Environment, 72-JAN. 
N.Y. ST. B.J. 38, 38 (2000). Antitrust actions are often brought jointly under the 
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prosecutions have focused primarily on investigations of horizontal 
monopolistic behavior and merger activity.220 There has been a 
notable dearth of predatory pricing prosecution, given that the 
Donnelly Act does not include any language prohibiting below-
cost pricing and that New York’s state and federal courts have 
generally construed the provisions of the Act in light of federal 
antitrust precedent.221 In cases that involve interpretations of the 
Donnelly Act in light of federal jurisprudence, the New York 
Court of Appeals has placed the burden of persuasion “on the one 
who contends that federal decisional law should not be 
followed.”222 For small business antitrust plaintiffs in New York, 
this signals a Brooke Group-type fate unless the state statute is 
amended. 
V. EVALUATING NEW YORK CITY’S LEGAL REMEDIES FOR BIG BOX 
DEVELOPMENT 
The arrival of The Home Depot in the Flatiron District and in 
Midtown marks the dawn of a new retail culture in Manhattan.223 
While this scenario has been documented extensively in the 
context of suburban and rural areas, it has largely been ignored on 
                                                          
Donnelly Act and federal antitrust statutes because the state law is not as 
comprehensive or developed as the federal law. Id. 
220 Cavanagh, supra note 219, at 38 (noting that New York antitrust 
enforcement “focuses principally on horizontal restraints and mergers”). 
However, the author also notes that in the past twenty years, “the Antitrust 
Bureau has been far more willing than federal authorities to prosecute cases 
involving vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance, supplier-imposed 
customer and territorial restraints and tying.” Id. 
221 Burton C. Agata, An Overview of Substantive Law Under the Donnelly 
Act, in ANTITRUST LAW IN NEW YORK STATE 47, 57 (Robert L. Hubbard & 
Pamela Jones Harbour eds., 2002) (“Although federal court decisions construing 
the Sherman Act cannot bind state court construction of the Donnelly Act, state 
and federal court decisions have emphasized the extent to which Sherman Act 
cases and doctrines have been adopted by the New York State courts in 
construing and applying the Donnelly Act.”). 
222 Id. at 57 (citing People v. Rattenni, 81 N.Y.2d 166 (1993)). 
223 See POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 6 (noting how New York 
City has changed, with bigger stores opening all the time). 
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the urban scale.224 Although many cities envy Manhattan’s ability 
to attract retail development in the age of suburbanization and an 
automobile-centric shopping culture, city and state administrators 
should proceed with caution.225 
Manhattan has always been a great place—a place where 
people love to work, live, and visit.226 With a larger variety of 
stores and activities than suburbs, city neighborhoods allow 
residents to form a special sense of place and attachment.227 Urban 
residents have the opportunity to browse around the city and 
encounter people, items, and experiences that are culturally 
strange, engaging in a “socially heterogeneous” experience.228 As 
the city becomes increasingly suburbanized, however, its 
consumption spaces will become more standardized and 
homogeneous, and the city will increasingly lose its sense of 
                                                          
224 Boswell & McGrath, supra note 24 (describing how large retailers have 
generally stayed away from urban markets because of high cost of land). See 
Karen Bellantoni, Big-Box Retailers Target Manhattan, REAL EST. WKLY., Jan. 
28, 2004, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3601/ 
is_24_50/ai_113140928 (describing how big box retailers had previously 
avoided Manhattan due to a scarcity of retail space, the lack of large parking 
lots, prohibitive retail rents, and the “high cost of labor, real estate taxes and 
utilities”). 
225 See Sakowicz, supra note 1, at 387 (noting that sprawl-type 
development usually occurs outside of city centers because it is less expensive). 
226 See Deborah C. Roth, Wish You Were Here: A Cross-Cultural Analysis 
of Architectural Preservation, Reconstruction, and the Contemporary Built 
Environment, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 395, 418-19 (2003). There is a 
difference between “space” and “place.” Id. Space is “indifferent and has no 
memory attached to it.” Id. (citing Barry Curtis, That Place Where: Some 
Thoughts on Memory and the City, in THE UNKNOWN CITY: CONTESTING 
ARCHITECTURE AND SOCIAL SPACE 55 (Iain Borden et al., eds., 2001). But place 
is a “by-product of our subjective relationship to a space via memory and 
association.” Id. 
227 Jeremy R. Meredith, Sprawl and the New Urbanist Solution, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 447, 461 (2003) (citing Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1048-49 (1996)). 
228 Sharon Zukin, Urban Lifestyles: Diversity and Standardization in 
Spaces of Consumption, 35 URB. STUDIES, May 1998, at 825. Zukin also 
describes her fascination with the variety of experiences that Manhattan’s shops 
and stores offer. POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 9. 
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place.229 Manhattan’s landscape of consumption, while still 
diverse, has homogenized over time, prompting one newspaper 
writer to warn that the city is turning into “Anywhere, USA.”230 
Faced with a shortage of suitable space, logistical problems 
such as traffic and supply concerns, and high real estate and 
operating costs, “big box” retailers traditionally have shied away 
from Manhattan.231 Until the early 1990s, Manhattan’s lack of 
large discount retailers was unique as compared to the rest of the 
nation.232 However, when one looks at the citywide dispersion of 
Staples and Office Depot and the recent opening of Home Depot, 
the trend suggests that Manhattan has begun to move toward the 
national norm.233 If Home Depot experiences financial success in 
Manhattan and the city government remains receptive to further 
“big box” development, other retailers may follow in Home 
                                                          
229 Gordon MacLeod et al., Negotiating the Contemporary City: 
Introduction, 40 URB. STUDIES, Aug. 2003, at 1655. 
230 Zukin, supra note 228 (writing that the diversity is “often submerged by 
the increasing standardization of consumption spaces”); Mark Jacobson, supra 
note 35, at 30 (lamenting the influx of national retailers and restaurants into 
Manhattan and wondering whether Manhattan is turning into “Anywhere, 
USA”). Not every Manhattan resident is sorry to see big box retailers move into 
their neighborhoods. See Rita Kramer, New York’s Missing Megastores, 6 CITY 
J. (1996), available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/ 6_4_new_yorks_ 
missing.html (noting that New York has become a “retail backwater” and that 
the city “sends its own residents elsewhere to do their shopping”). Kramer 
describes the retailing boom of nearby suburbs and laments that Manhattan 
residents used to be forced to leave the city to shop at stores like Wal-Mart, 
Kmart and Home Depot. Id. Kramer believes that big stores bestow benefits on 
the surrounding community and that “if big retailers are allowed to flourish, 
small businesses don’t die; they adapt and take advantage of the wider market.” 
Id. 
231 See POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 66 (discussing the high price 
of land, difficulty of making deliveries, and zoning laws as barriers to entry); 
Boswell & McGrath, supra note 24 (citing Manhattan residents’ intense 
“NIMBYism” as an additional concern for the big box retailers. “NIMBY” 
stands for “Not In My Backyard” and describes the cultural phenomenon of 
grass-roots resistance to development with potentially negative local 
consequences). 
232 POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 65. 
233 Tsao, supra note 63 (stating that Kmart moved into its East Village 
location in 1996). 
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Depot’s footsteps and change the city inalterably.234 Although 
these retailers continue to woo city officials with promises of job 
creation and revenue for the city, New York City anti-“big box” 
advocates have several options for combating this wave of retail 
development.235 
Traditionally, community advocates have grounded their 
challenges to this type of retail development in three principal 
areas of the law—zoning, environmental, and antitrust law.236 This 
section will address each of these alternatives, discuss the 
attributes and drawbacks of each, and ultimately recommend 
which option is best suited to fighting unwanted retail development 
in Manhattan. 
A. Shortfalls of Zoning Law 
Although zoning ordinances provide a means of monitoring 
and controlling development at the grassroots level and enjoy great 
deference from New York courts, New York’s state zoning law is 
of limited effectiveness in confronting the challenges of sprawl. 
The participants in the zoning process, the process itself, the state 
statutory language and New York City’s use of as-of-right 
development permitting have combined to limit the ability of 
zoning to curb retail growth. 
The ability of zoning regulations to address local needs is 
notably thwarted by the member structure of New York City’s 
Planning Commission and the attendant rules that govern the 
zoning process.237 Because zoning cannot be justified unless it fits 
                                                          
234 See Bellantoni, supra note 224. Bellantoni believes that Manhattan will 
likely see more big box development as other major retailers enter the market, 
especially if the delivery service for large and bulky products proves successful. 
Id. Target is eyeing a space as large as 200,000 square feet, Kohl’s is looking for 
120,000 square feet and Costco is mulling 150,000 square feet. Id. Home Depot 
may be only the beginning. 
235 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (describing the promises big 
box retailers make concerning jobs and revenue). 
236 See Part II.C; III.B; and IV.B (discussing the zoning, environmental, 
and antitrust law options respectively). 
237 See Nolon, supra 67, at 351-52 (“Zoning is a key method by which 
society encourages the development of jobs and housing, protects natural 
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into a comprehensive plan, zoning ordinances fall within the 
authority of the New York City Planning Commission.238 The 
Planning Commission is comprised of thirteen members of the 
public.239 The Mayor appoints seven members, each of the five 
Borough Presidents appoints one, and the Public Advocate 
appoints the last.240 Since commission members are not publicly 
elected and are subject to little oversight, the ordinances that 
emerge from the planning process may reflect the specific interests 
of members rather than the general welfare of the community.241 
                                                          
resources and the environment, and defines the character of its communities.”). 
But see Amy Widman, Replacing Politics with Democracy: A Proposal for 
Community Planning in New York City and Beyond, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 135, 149 
(2002) (arguing that New York City’s planning process “suffers from a lack of 
inclusive public participation”). 
238 See CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 197-c. This 
section creates and describes the “Uniform Land Use Review Procedure.” Id. 
Under this section, the Commission reviews applications submitted that fall 
within several categories stated in § 197-c (a) and either certify the application 
or recommend that it be revised. Id. §197-c (c). 
239 New York City Department of City Planning, About Us - Commission 
Information (2004), at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/about/plancom.html. 
240 Id. The five boroughs of New York City are Brooklyn, Manhattan, 
Staten Island, Queens, and the Bronx. The Public Advocate is an elected official 
who serves as a go-between for City residents and their government. Public 
Advocate for the City of New York, About the Public Advocate, at 
http://www.pubadvocate.nyc.gov/about.shtml. 
241 Platt, supra note 66, at 251. See Widman, supra note 237, at 150 
(advocating for greater public participation in the New York City planning 
process and asserting that the city planning process “suffers from an overall lack 
of emphasis on inclusive public participation”); Nolon, supra note 67, at 360 
(noting that since “a planning board is comprised of appointed, rather than 
elected, members, the pressure of the electorate is felt less in its deliberations”); 
Tom Angotti, “As-of-Right” Development: An Invitation to Ethical Breaches?, 
GothamGazette.com (2003), at http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/landuse/ 
20030619/12/430. In this article, the author highlights the shortfalls of the 
zoning process in New York City. Id. Additionally, the author speaks to 
allegations of impropriety within the City Planning Department. Id. During 
discussions regarding a proposed Home Depot store in Brooklyn, a former city 
planner alleges that “[w]hile participating in meetings with the project 
developers, their attorneys, and City Planning staff, [she] witnessed [her] own 
staff utilize the zoning code to assist the developers in designing an as-of-right 
project in order to avoid community engagement.” Id. 
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Zoning in the state of New York generally has “evolved into a 
flexible, if unpredictable, method of land use regulation.”242 
Although the language of the state’s zoning requirements appears 
specific, state courts have given broad construction to the statute’s 
words.243 Thus, the judicial climate that surrounds zoning-related 
litigation is decidedly deferential to cities and their zoning 
boards.244 As a result, New York City has met with little difficulty 
in crafting zoning ordinances that meet the standard of New York 
state judicial review.245 So long as a zoning ordinance is drafted 
with a larger, comprehensive plan in mind, it will be upheld in 
state court.246 Indeed, zoning ordinances enjoy such great judicial 
deference that it is difficult to successfully challenge development 
decisions that occur in accordance with city and state zoning 
prescriptions.247 This can result in development that complies with 
zoning regulations, but does not necessarily benefit members of the 
community. 
Advocates also criticize zoning as a “piecemeal” approach to 
land use.248 Once land is zoned for a specific use and an investor 
purchases that land for development consistent with the designated 
                                                          
242 Nolon, supra note 67, at 370. 
243 See id. at 371-73 for a discussion of the various ways courts have 
interpreted the meaning of New York state zoning regulations. 
244 See Dur-Bar Realty Co. v. City of Utica, 57 A.D.2d 51 (4th Dep’t. 
1977); Town of Bedford v. Vill. of Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178 (1973) 
(standing for the proposition that as long as a town has zoned in accordance with 
a “comprehensive plan,” the ordinance will be upheld). Additionally, it is 
important to note that when a plaintiff challenges an existing zoning ordinance, 
he carriers the heavy burden of proving non-conformance with a comprehensive 
plan. See Nolon, supra note 67, at 402-3. 
245 See supra note 86 for text of the N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §20(25) requiring 
land use decisions to be in accordance with a “well considered plan.” Id. 
246 See Nolon, supra note 67, at 393 (noting how “compliance with a 
comprehensive plan will save even the most burdensome land regulations” from 
being invalidated). 
247 See Part II.A (discussing the judicial deference exhibited towards zoning 
decisions made in accordance with a plan). 
248 See Shoemaker, supra note 6, at 904 (noting that opposition to 
Vermont’s Act 250, a zoning and land use statute, focuses on the statute’s 
reactionary stance and piecemeal solutions). 
CODEY MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC 3/7/2005 6:59 PM 
 MANAGING RETAIL SPRAWL IN MANHATTAN 297 
use, it is difficult for a zoning board to block the proposed 
development project.249 In New York City, land is frequently 
designated for “as-of-right development,” which permits 
development without any review by the Planning Commission.250 
To commence construction on a project, a developer in this 
situation need only secure a building permit.251 This lot-by-lot 
approach, including the granting of automatic development rights, 
fails to properly account for the impact of development projects on 
the surrounding community.252 What appears sufficient on a 
building permit application may mask potential economic impacts 
on area retailers.253 As a result, as-of-right development “often 
frustrates efforts by communities to influence the design of new 
projects in a way that makes them compatible with existing 
development and the community’s visions for the future of the 
neighborhood.”254 
B. Shortfalls of Environmental Approach 
In tandem with zoning challenges, community advocates also 
may employ environmental law to combat the adverse effects of 
                                                          
249 This is termed “as-of-right development.” For a discussion, see supra 
note 121 and accompanying text. 
250 See New York City Department of City Planning, Zoning, About 
Zoning – Terms and Procedures, at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/ 
zonetod.html (defining “as-of-right development”) (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). 
251 Id. 
252 See Angotti, supra note 241 (noting the drawbacks to as-of-right 
development). 
253 Id. 
254 Id. The author points to the 2003 resignation of a professional planner 
assigned to the Brooklyn Office of City Planning as evidence that the as-of-right 
development process raises ethical concerns. Id. The planner alleged that the 
planning staff “ ‘utilize[d] the zoning code to assist the developers in designing 
an as-of-right project in order to avoid community engagement.’” Id. Angotti 
asserts that as-of-right zoning leaves too many decisions to be made behind 
closed doors. Id. For additional concern about close ties between city 
administrative officials and private developers see Charles V. Bagli, For City 
Official and Developer, Close Ties Mean Close Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
2004, at A1 (describing the problems inherent when former business executives 
move into the public sector and are in a position to exhibit favoritism). 
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proposed development projects. New York’s environmental review 
statute, SEQRA, seeks to incorporate environmental consequences 
into the decision-making processes of government bodies.255 
Acting in tandem, SEQRA and CEQR require that state and city 
agencies conduct environmental analyses before undertaking any 
project, activity, or policy-making exercise.256 Despite favorable 
SEQRA precedent in New York, however, environmental law is a 
limited vehicle for anti-development litigation against future Home 
Depots or Wal-Marts.257 
The SEQRA and CEQR notably emphasize compliance with 
the review procedures they outline.258 This focus on procedural 
rather than substantive compliance has caused environmentalists to 
claim that SEQRA has lost its “environmentalist spirit”259 and that 
its processes have become too time consuming and expensive, and 
have compelled permit applicants to evade or circumvent the 
statute.260 Further eroding the force of the statute, some courts have 
become satisfied with mere procedural compliance with SEQRA 
and have come to overlook consideration of whether the statute’s 
substantive goals have been realized.261 
                                                          
255 Monahan, supra note 103, at 543 (describing goals of SEQRA). 
256 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(4) (describing which agency 
actions trigger environmental analysis). 
257 See Chinese Staff and Workers Ass’n v. City of New York, 68 N.Y.2d 
359, 368 (1986). This case serves as favorable precedent for those wishing to 
challenge big box retail development since it allows the impact on community 
character and businesses to be included in the term “environment.” Id. 
258 See Effective Weapon, supra note 113, at 316 (describing how courts 
became sticklers for making sure that applicants followed SEQRA procedures). 
259 See generally Monahan, supra note 103, at 542. Environmentalists 
criticize SEQRA’s emphasis that applicants meet procedural requirements, 
arguing that the legislation has lost sight of what it is meant to achieve. Id. 
260 Id. at 575 (describing how SEQRA falls short because it does not 
account for the economic or temporal realities of the EIS process). Applicants 
know that they potentially will be subjected to a time-consuming, expensive, 
and unwieldy process and thus try to evade the process when possible. Id. at 
574-75. See e.g., Citizens Against Retail Sprawl ex rel. Ciancio v. Giza, 280 
A.D.2d 234, 238 (2001). SEQRA requires agencies to meet all procedural 
statutory requirements. This is a time-consuming endeavor and may dissuade 
agencies from undertaking SEQRA review. Id. 
261 Monahan, supra note 103, at 541-42. See Effective Weapon, supra note 
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Critics also note a weakness in SEQRA’s reliance on a “lead 
agency” to conduct and oversee the environmental review.262 As 
one commentator writes, “the designation of the lead agency is 
vital to whether genuine SEQRA compliance will occur” since 
some agencies may be more willing to shrug off their 
responsibilities than others.263 By handing over so much 
responsibility to one agency, SEQRA fails to ensure that each 
project’s environmental issues receive equal depth of review. 
New York’s existing statutes are insufficient to combat the 
influx of “big box” retailers within the city’s borders.264 If 
developers are able to circumvent environmental conservation 
legislation, then there is little to stop city agencies from granting 
building permits and approving zoning changes. Although an 
environmental approach allows challengers to a project to come 
forward before development, obstacles such as extreme judicial 
deference and confusion over which governmental body will 
become the lead agency still exist and act as barriers to fully 
unlocking the “conservationist potential” of SEQRA.265 
C. Shortfalls of Antitrust Law 
Despite the applicability of the Sherman, Clayton, and 
Robinson-Patman Acts to the prosecution of predatory pricing 
                                                          
113, at 316 (discussing the disadvantage to emphasizing procedural 
compliance). As long as agencies follow the procedures of SEQRA, “courts are 
reluctant to interfere with the actual determinations governments make.” Id. 
262 See Effective Weapon, supra note 113, at 321-22. 
263 Id. at 321. 
264 See In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 702 A.2d 397 (Vt. 1997) (discussing 
Vermont’s SEQRA-like Statute “Act 250,” which allows zoning boards to give 
significant weight to financial and economic effects of proposed development). 
Wal-Mart argued that the state environmental board should not have considered 
Wal-Mart’s impact on the surrounding retail market. Id. The Vermont Supreme 
Court disagreed. Id. It is important to note that along with SEQRA, NEPA has 
its critics as well, with many urging that the statute has lost its teeth. See Bradley 
C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333 (2004) (evaluating 
ways that NEPA falls short and advocating solutions to make it stronger). 
265 Monahan, supra note 103, at 576. See Effective Weapon, supra note 
113, at 316-18. 
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schemes used by national chain stores, courts and federal agencies 
have not been receptive to these challenges since the 1960s.266 This 
era of federal suspicion has not helped New York small business 
plaintiffs who strive to remain in business a mile from a Wal-Mart 
or Target store. Although some states have expressly provided 
small business owners with statutory protection from large 
competitors who engage in below-cost pricing, New York has yet 
to embrace this approach.267 The combination of federal skepticism 
toward predatory pricing plaintiffs and insufficient state protection 
renders New York City’s small business owners vulnerable in the 
face of “big box” development. 
Economists have noted a shift from the “populist era of 
predatory pricing enforcement”268 during the Great Depression to 
the current antitrust prosecution strategy, which is markedly less 
aggressive and favors larger companies and lower prices for 
consumers.269 In Brooke Group, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth a 
                                                          
266 See Bolton, supra note 184, at 2250 (noting that during the early years 
of the RPA, enforcement of federal antitrust statutes protected small firms from 
price-cutting by large sellers). See also Boudreaux, supra note 171, at 57 
(stating that since Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) 
there had not been a predatory pricing case until Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993)). 
267 For a successful state regime, see supra notes 207-211 (discussing 
successful state unfair practices litigation for below-cost sales in Oklahoma). 
See infra Part IV.C. for a discussion of how New York’s current antitrust statute 
is insufficient for the small business plaintiff. 
268 Bolton, supra note 184, at 2250. 
269 See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Turn of the 21st Century: A View 
From the Middle, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 583, 586 (2002) (“Antitrust in the 
United States is now primarily, though not exclusively, designed to protect the 
welfare of consumers.”); See also David Close, “Don’t Fear the Reaper”: Why 
Transferable Assets and Avoidable Costs Should Not Resurrect Predatory 
Pricing, 88 IOWA L. REV. 433, 435 (2003) (explaining that the Supreme Court 
decision in Brooke Group has hobbled plaintiffs seeking to bring suits under 
federal antitrust legislation since); See also McCall, supra note 182, at 315. The 
Warren Court from 1953 to 1969 expansively interpreted federal antitrust 
legislation in favor of plaintiffs. This era ended in 1980. Id. Federal agencies 
have had a difficult time determining when to prosecute and when to let market 
forces take their course. Close, supra, at 440; Pitofsky, supra, at 584-85 
(describing the evolution of federal antitrust enforcement over different 
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higher evidentiary standard for predatory pricing cases and 
required the plaintiffs to make an extensive two-part showing to 
prove the existence of price discrimination under section 13(a) of 
the Robinson-Patman Act.270 Unfortunately, the philosophy behind 
the Brooke Group decision lives on. Since the Brooke Group 
decision, private plaintiffs have had limited success in court 
because of “(1) exacting proof and pleading requirements, spurred 
by the Supreme Court’s open invitation to dismiss predatory 
pricing cases by summary means; (2) skepticism that predation can 
ever be a plausible business strategy; [and] . . . (3) judicial neglect 
of modern strategic theories of predatory pricing.”271 However, 
many economists support the Brooke Group decision and argue 
that courts should take a hands-off approach to regulating market 
conditions at the risk of extinguishing competitive pricing 
altogether.272 Under this rationale, predatory pricing is considered 
“a successful and fully rational business strategy.”273 This view, 
however, fails to acknowledge the dangers of predatory pricing 
once competitors are able to force rivals from the marketplace.274 
By compelling a rival’s exit from the market or precluding a 
retailer’s entrance into the market, a predatory retailer can raise 
prices and reduce innovation and product variety without 
consequence.275 
Despite evidence that predatory pricing may be used as an 
                                                          
presidential administrations). 
270 Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209, 222-27 
(1993). 
271 Bolton, supra note 184, at 2259. See also Peterson, supra note 2, at 352 
(“The Supreme Court’s ruling in Brooke Group may have signaled the eventual 
demise of predatory pricing claims.”). 
272 Boudreaux, supra note 171, at 58-59. 
273 Bolton, supra note 184, at 2241. 
274 See id. at 2242. 
275 See id. at 2243 (stating that “the anticompetitive effects of predatory 
pricing are higher prices and reduced output—including reduced innovation”); 
Roy Beth Kelley, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. American Drugs, Inc.; Drawing the 
Line Between Predatory and Competitive Pricing, 50 ARK. L. REV. 103, 125 
(1997) (conceding that although loss leader pricing can be good for consumers 
because it brings lower prices, a retailer can engage in this practice and then 
raise prices and eventually harm consumers). 
CODEY MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC 3/7/2005 6:59 PM 
302 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
instrument of economic abuse, some argue that courts and 
economists have failed to sufficiently recognize the dangers of 
below-cost pricing or protect small business entrepreneurs from 
predatory tactics of larger competitors.276 The federal concept of 
predatory pricing balances the anti-competitive harm of an action 
against its pro-competitive impact in order to determine whether 
the action violates a federal statute.277 Courts and agencies, 
however, have faced difficulties in interpreting federal antitrust 
law in a manner that preserves a fair balance between competitors, 
competition, and consumers.278 Courts often engage in only a brief 
analysis of pricing practices, and enforcement agencies feel 
pressure from economists to support pro-big business policies that 
enhance market efficiency.279 These forces combine to create an 
uncertain environment for small-business antitrust plaintiffs.280 
                                                          
276 Bolton, supra note 184, at 2241. 
277 Borghesani, supra note 151, at 76 (noting that this concept is termed 
“rule of reason” analysis). 
278 See Close, supra note 269, at 440 (stating that judges and policy makers 
are plagued by the desire to strike a balance between the interest in prohibiting 
anticompetitive predatory practices and preserving low prices); Pitofsky, supra 
note 269, at 586, 588 (asserting that predatory pricing usually benefits 
consumers because the practice lowers prices). 
279 See Borghesani, supra note 269, at 81. When a court sees that consumer 
prices have dropped because of the actions the plaintiff complains of, the 
analysis usually stops there, but fails to account for long-term market effects. Id. 
If lower prices drive competitors from the market, consumers will be later 
harmed by a narrowed variety of goods and retailers who sell them. Id. Also, 
agencies face pressure from economists who fear forsaking efficiency in the 
name of predatory pricing prosecution. See Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 
1358 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that “[a] firm that cuts its prices is not necessarily 
engaging in predatory pricing. It may simply be responding to new competition, 
or to a downturn in market demand”); Bolton, supra note 184, at 2241 (noting 
that the consensus view in modern economics is that predatory pricing “can be a 
successful and fully rational business strategy”); Boudreaux, supra note 171, at 
63. Since investigation into and prosecution of potential predatory pricing 
schemes costs time and money, economists feel that the determination should be 
left to market forces for the sake of efficiency. Id. 
280 The Supreme Court has taken a favorable position towards big business, 
state legislatures have enacted antitrust statutes that range in coverage, and 
policymakers are split on the effectiveness of antitrust legislation. See Kelley, 
supra note 275, at 121 (discussing opposing economic theories). See also 
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The greatest obstacle facing New York antitrust plaintiffs 
remains the absence of a state unfair business statute comparable to 
those of California or Oklahoma.281 To achieve an even playing 
field with retailers of all sizes, New York’s business community 
deserves a broad-reaching state antitrust statute that protects 
competition and competitors.282 These two objectives are not 
mutually exclusive, despite the Brooke Group court’s assertion that 
antitrust law is intended to protect competition not competitors.283 
In fact, frequently “individual competitors must be protected in the 
interest of preserving competition.”284 A New York statute that 
prohibits loss leader selling and predatory pricing would serve the 
interests of New York’s market and simultaneously protect its 
participants. 
VI. NEW YORK CITY’S BEST BET: RE-DRAFT THE STATE 
ANTITRUST STATUTE 
As unique enterprises, small retail and service-oriented stores 
have both economic and cultural importance to New York City’s 
economy.285 Although the bright signs and billboards of retail 
behemoths often overshadow the contributions of the city’s small 
businesses, “a vibrant small business sector, despite its ills and 
                                                          
Peterson, supra note 2, at 354 (commenting that judges have become suspicious 
of antitrust plaintiffs’ ulterior motives). 
281 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 598.1-598.11 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-
17210 (West 2004). 
282 See Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of 
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1076-77 (1979) (stating that goals of justice 
and antitrust laws sometimes demand protection of competitors as well as 
competition). 
283 See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 220 (emphasizing that by its terms, the 
RPA only outlaws price discrimination when it threatens to injure competition, 
not when it might injure competitors). 
284 Schwartz, supra note 282, at 1077. 
285 Blake D. Morant, The Quest for Bargains in an Age of Contractual 
Formalism: Strategic Initiatives for Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 233, 240-41 (2003). 
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pitfalls, becomes a key determinant of a healthy economy.”286 In 
order to enhance New York City’s financial vibrancy, the city’s 
small business sector should be preserved and encouraged to grow. 
To best accomplish this goal, the New York state legislature 
should re-draft New York’s existing antitrust statute to better suit 
the interests of small retailers and consumers. 
A. Proposed Expansion of New York’s Antitrust Statute 
Despite economists’ concerns regarding the feasibility of state 
involvement in antitrust litigation,287 state antitrust statutes have 
assumed a unique role within antitrust litigation.288 However, 
difficulties with jurisdictional issues, questions of allowable 
damages, and enforcement complications between states and 
federal agencies have dissuaded states from passing their own 
prominent antitrust legislation.289 This trend is distressing, given 
that state-level antitrust legislation is critical to the welfare of both 
consumers and small businesses.290 Unlike federal antitrust 
litigation, “most state antitrust enforcement focuses on cases with 
particular localized impact on consumers, whether they are brought 
by a single state alone or on a multistate basis.”291 The protection 
of New York City’s consumers and small retailers requires strong 
state-level antitrust legislation and enforcement. Although New 
York has antitrust legislation on the books, it presently lacks the 
strength to adequately protect what makes New York City 
                                                          
286 Id. at 244. 
287 Prominent judicial commentator and economist Richard Posner has 
called for states to cease involvement in antitrust litigation and has 
recommended that states repeal their antitrust legislation. See Richard A. Posner, 
Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940-42 (2001). 
288 State antitrust prosecution differs from federal prosecution because the 
state statutes are broader in their proscriptions and employ a specific definition 
of “cost.” See supra Part I.V.B. 
289 First, supra note 216, at 1033-40. 
290 See id. at 1019 (state antitrust legislation is better able to address local 
concerns than federal). 
291 Id. 
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unique.292 
The New York Antitrust Bureau states that the goal of New 
York antitrust legislation is to “ensure that industry is competitive, 
with a number of manufacturers or distributors of a product or 
service, all striving to attract customers.”293 Although New York’s 
antitrust legislation aims to protect both competition and 
consumers, the statute is not strong enough to enable the Bureau to 
fully accomplish its goals of protecting and ensuring a free market 
economy.294 The Donnelly Act’s failure to prohibit loss leaders 
effectively handcuffs the Antitrust Bureau and prevents the agency 
from sufficiently protecting the interests of New York’s small 
businesses from encroaching “big box” retailers.295 
The New York State legislature should follow the lead of 
California and Oklahoma in entering the sphere of localized, 
aggressive antitrust enforcement.296 Through state antitrust 
enforcement, states may distance themselves from federal antitrust 
policies and adopt a more lenient threshold for plaintiffs.297 So 
long as a state statute does not preempt federal law, its scope may 
be broader than that of federal legislation.298 
New York may want to model its new antitrust legislation on 
                                                          
292 California, Florida, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Texas are considered to 
have expansive antitrust legislation. First, supra note 216, at 1016. First also 
recognizes that despite other states having stronger legislation than New York, 
there are still many states that have passed weaker antitrust legislation than that 
of New York. Id. 
293 Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Antitrust 
Enforcement in New York (2004), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/business/ 
antitrust.html. 
294 See id. (stating that the antitrust laws are “aimed at protecting 
consumers’ purchasing power and saving jobs and businesses, all at the same 
time”). 
295 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 340-347 (McKinney 2004). 
296 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 598.1-598.11 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-
17210 (West 2004). 
297 See First, supra note 216, at 1037 (describing how, for better or worse, 
the paths of state and federal litigation often diverge); Peterson, supra note 2, at 
358 (states may make it easier for plaintiffs to demonstrate predatory intent). 
298 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
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the unfair practices legislation of California, which is even more 
comprehensive than the Oklahoma statute.299 The state’s two major 
antitrust statutes, the Unlawful Practices Act (UPA)300 and the 
Unfair Competition Act (UCA),301 aim to protect both consumers 
and businesses.302 California’s statutory antitrust prohibitions 
enjoy the broadest possible application.303 The statutes proscribe a 
wider range of activities than the federal statutes and employ a 
specific, plaintiff-friendly definition of “cost.”304 For the purpose 
of determining whether a seller is pricing below cost, the 
California UPA employs the seller’s “average total cost” (ATC).305 
By including all possible business expenses of the seller in the 
calculation, the average total cost for a product increases. The UPA 
thus makes it easier for a plaintiff to prove that a seller sold goods 
below cost.306 
California offers a second advantage to plaintiffs bringing suit 
under the California UPA for predatory, below-cost pricing. 
Section 17071 of the UPA stipulates that proof of a below-cost sale 
plus “proof of the injurious effect of such acts is presumptive 
                                                          
299 California has two state statutes prohibiting unfair business practices, 
while Oklahoma has one. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 598.1-598.11 (West 
2004); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (West 2004). 
300 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 2004). 
301 Id. §§ 17200-17210 (West 2004). 
302 See STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN 
CALIFORNIA (2004), at http://ag.ca.gov/antitrust/publications/antitrust.pdf 
(noting that its antitrust enforcement helps both consumers and businesses). 
303 See McCall, supra note 182, at 312. 
304 See id at 311-12. For example, the California Unfair Pricing Act 
specifically prohibits the use of loss leaders by retailers. Id. This is a notable 
omission from federal antitrust legislation, and one that hurts federal small 
business antitrust plaintiffs. Id. 
305 Id. at 316. Section 17026 of the UPA sets forth its definition of “cost.” 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17026 (West 2004). For a complete discussion of 
average total cost and other variations, see supra Part I.V.B. 
306 McCall, supra note 182, at 316. A California state court decided that as 
long as the cost formula is related to legislative intent to prevent monopolistic 
behavior, the California UPA may set forth a different standard than the federal 
antitrust statutes. See Turnbull & Turnbull v. ARA Transp., Inc., 219 Cal. App. 
3d 811 (1990). 
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evidence of the purpose or intent to injure competitors or destroy 
competition.”307 This rebuttable presumption eases the burden of 
proof for the plaintiff, while allowing the defendant to rebut the 
presumption by showing that the below-cost pricing was due to 
good faith mistake.308 
The greatest advantage a California antitrust plaintiff enjoys 
over a New York plaintiff stems from California UPA section 
17044, which defines and prohibits the use of loss leaders in 
product pricing.309 Section 17030 defines a loss leader as “an item 
sold at less than cost where: (a) the purpose of the seller is to 
induce the purchase of other merchandise, or (b) the effect is a 
tendency to deceive purchasers, or (c) the effect is to divert trade 
from or injure competitors.”310 Because large national retailers 
often establish dominance within a market by below-cost, loss 
leader pricing, a revision to the New York antitrust legislation that 
adopts California’s prohibition on loss leader pricing would benefit 
potential plaintiffs.311 With an expanded New York antitrust 
statute, a small business owner could press the Attorney General to 
bring suit against retailers such as Home Depot, Kmart, and Wal-
Mart to preserve fair competition and the integrity of New York 
City’s retail market.312 
New York Governor George Pataki and Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer must recognize the need for stronger state-level antitrust 
legislation within New York. Existing federal antitrust statutes and 
New York’s Donnelly Act are insufficient to protect small 
businesses. The weaknesses of New York’s antitrust regime are 
                                                          
307 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17071 (West 2004). 
308 McCall, supra note 182, at 333. 
309 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17044 (West 2004). 
310 McCall, supra note 182, at 337 (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 
17030 (West 2004)). 
311 See Bianco & Zellner, supra note 38 (discussing the market dominance 
of Wal-Mart and its retail tactics). 
312 If New York were to model its statute after those of California or 
Oklahoma and prohibit loss leader, small business plaintiffs may be able to 
obtain injunctions against big box retailers for below-cost pricing like those in 
Star Fuel Marts. Star Fuel Marts v. Murphy Oil USA, No. Civ.-02-202-F, 2003 
WL 742191 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 29, 2003). For a complete discussion of Star Fuel 
Marts, see supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text. 
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amplified by the pro-big business orientation of the state and 
federal judiciary following the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke 
Group.313 Although the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. 
Department of Justice have jurisdiction to prosecute alleged 
violations of federal antitrust legislation, state antitrust 
enforcement offers unique advantages.314 States understand their 
local conditions and have the opportunity to bring suits as a public 
entity against violators of the statutes.315 Thus, states can better 
tailor their antitrust legislation to suit the needs of local markets 
and can selectively enforce the legislation when necessary in order 
to better benefit the public good.316 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past one hundred years, American antitrust litigation 
has developed into an intricate, multi-tiered system.317 
Applications of federal and state statutes have varied in type and 
scope. The federal predatory pricing plaintiff faces serious judicial 
obstacles, but states are in a distinct position to provide relief.318 
The nation now has a legal and institutional framework that 
provides states with “the jurisdiction and the capacity to prosecute 
                                                          
313 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
314 First, supra note 216, at 1004 (discussing the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Trade Commission and Department of Justice); Id. at 1040 (noting the unique 
public policy perspective that states bring to antitrust enforcement). 
315 Id. at 1040. See Cavanagh, supra note 219, at 41-42. Cavanagh believes 
that “where state interests are pre-eminent, prosecutions by the state are more 
likely to be effective” at protecting consumers’ interests for two reasons. Id. at 
41. First, “state officials are closer to the action than federal officials and would 
normally be advanced than their federal counterparts on the learning curve.” Id. 
Second, “state involvement from the outset is likely to be more efficient, since 
federal enforcers are apt to enlist significant state resources in any event.” Id. at 
42. 
316 It is essential to note that state antitrust enforcement has its opponents. 
See Posner, supra note 287, at 925. 
317 See supra Part I.V. for a discussion of the intersection among the 
various federal and state antitrust statutes and their different proscriptions. 
318 See Peterson, supra note 2, at 341 (relating how courts fear that 
plaintiffs may use federal antitrust legislation for improper ends). 
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violations of both federal and state antitrust law.”319 Zoning and 
environmental law options do not offer the same advantages as the 
adoption of a strong, specific antitrust statute.320 New York’s 
legislature should take advantage of opportunities to fortify the 
state’s antitrust regime and protect the state’s small business sector 
while preserving New York City’s character. 
The phenomenon of sprawl is no longer exclusive to rural 
areas. Although it is traditionally a concern of suburbs and rural 
areas, one land use and environmental attorney notes that “the loss 
of neighborhood character and open space are consistent problems 
faced by New York City” following the entrance of big box 
retailers.321 Manhattan is known for its wide variety of small shops 
and businesses.322 However, as big box retailers enter New York 
City’s market, Manhattan grows closer to losing the unique retail 
landscape that residents and historians have come to treasure. Each 
time a big box store opens its doors, more Manhattanites are 
tempted to embrace the convenience that such a store offers— a 
result that will homogenize the borough and permanently change 
its feel. Although one big box store does not signal the end of 
Manhattan as we know it, one on each block just might. 
 
                                                          
319 First, supra note 216, at 1040. 
320 See infra Parts V(A) and V(B) for a discussion of the shortfalls of 
zoning and environmental law in protecting communities against big box retail 
development. 
321 Christopher Rizzo, Protecting the Environment at the Local Level: New 
York City’s Special District Approach, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 225, 228 
(2002). 
322 POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 65. Until the time that discount 
superstores came to Manhattan, “shopping in the city’s residential 
neighborhoods was an intensely personal experience. You shopped for each item 
in a small, specialized, independently owned store, whose owner usually had a 
story, and hearing that story was part of the experience of both living in the 
neighborhood and shopping there.” Id. 
